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INTRODUCTION: LOSING SIGHT OF THE BALL
Reading the Supreme Court's opinion in Reno v. American-Arab Anti-
Discrimination Committee (American-Arab),' it is difficult to remember
that the case, now in its thirteenth year, has grown, in the words of Henry
James, into a "baggy monster." The case began with a First Amendment
challenge to a since-repealed statute that rendered aliens deportable for
their associations and beliefs. The INS set the whole thing into motion
when it charged seven Palestinians and one Kenyan "under various provi-
sions of the McCarran-Walter Act of 1952 (1952 Act) for membership in
an organization, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP),
that allegedly advocates the doctrines of world communism."2 It is almost
as difficult to be certain that some years from now, it will end with the
Court confronting the constitutionality of at least one statute that has ren-
dered aliens deportable for engaging in fund-raising activities on behalf of
so-called "terrorist organizations."3
This Article has three goals. First, the Article re-focuses attention on the
government's asserted statutory authority, its heavy-handed efforts to stifle
political expression under that authority, and the important First Amend-
ment issues that these efforts raise. Second, it explains why the First
I. 119S.Ct.936(1999).
2. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. v. Reno, 70 F.3d 1045, 1052-53 (9th
Cir. 1995) (AAADC I).
3. At various times, some or all of the aliens whose right to remain in the United
States is at issue in the American-Arab litigation have been charged with violating the Im-
migration and Nationality Act (INA), section 212(a)(28)(D), (F), and (G), as well as section
241 (a)(6)(D), (F), and (G) (as they existed prior to 1998). These sections were amended by
the Foreign Relations Authorization Act (FRAA), Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989, Pub. L. No.
100-204, § 901(a), 101 Stat. 1331, 1399-400 (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 2651). These same
sections were later repealed by INA sections 212(a)(3)(B), Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat.
4978 (1990) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § l182(a)(3)(B) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998)) and
237(a)(4)(B), Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978 (1990) (codified at 8 U.S.C. §
1227(a)(4)(B) (Supp. III 1997)). There is also a possibility that they will be changed in the
future with one or more provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of
1996 (AEDPA), Pub. L. No. 104-132, tit. III and IV, 110 Stat. 1214, 1247-81 (codified at
scattered sections of 8 and 18 U.S.C. (Supp. IV 1998)).
[52:1
AMERICAN-ARAB
Amendment issues so central to the case are virtually invisible in the Su-
preme Court's recent opinion. In so doing, it will point to a number of rea-
sons, including several unfavorable early judicial opinions in the Ninth Cir-
cuit, the legal strategy of the aliens facing deportation, and some important
changes in the underlying substantive and procedural immigration law. Yet
it will also demonstrate that Justice Scalia's majority opinion is carefully
crafted to "hide the ball," that is, to elevate form over substance, with
empty rhetoric about the government's hypothetical interests over the ac-
tual harm inflicted on the respondents and on the political process during a
thirteen-year campaign to deter unpopular political expression.
Finally, this Article briefly shows that this approach to governmental
power and alien rights is not unique, but instead is typical of the way that
the Court has dealt with immigration matters over the last two decades.
Immigration law inevitably involves a balancing of interests. The govern-
ment has the right to enforce its immigration laws, and to protect its citi-
zenry from the dangers posed by those afflicted with communicable dis-
eases, by criminals, and by terrorists. The government also has the right to
take action against aliens who plot terror, or engage actively in violence or
subversion. Aliens at the "threshold" of entry traditionally have been af-
forded only the rights that Congress chooses to grant them. Yet many of
those entering from abroad are protected by United States statutes or inter-
national treaties. All have the right to have the immigration statutes inter-
preted fairly, to tell their stories, and to have them listened to without pre-
judgment. Permanent resident aliens4 and non-immigrants physically
present in the United States are protected by the Constitution and entitled to
due process in deportation proceedings. They are also entitled to associate
and engage in debate about matters of public concern. American-Arab -
like most immigration cases decided by the Supreme Court during the
Rehnquist years - strikes the wrong balance, putting its thumb firmly on
the government's side of the scale.
4. "Permanent residents" do not surrender their constitutional protection when they
briefly leave the United States and then attempt to re-enter it. See Landon v. Plasencia, 459
U.S. 21, 33 (1982).
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I. STIFLING SPEECH AND ASSOCIATION: THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN-
ARAB
A. The Legal and Factual Context
1. Phase One: 1987-ca. 1990
a. The Court's Opinion
Justice Scalia's majority opinion opens with a three-sentence summary
of the case, which treats it exclusively as a "selective enforcement" case
where the federal courts perhaps have been deprived ofjurisdiction by con-
gressional action. The Court states:
Respondents sued petitioners for allegedly targeting them for deportation because of
their affiliation with a politically unpopular group. While their suit was pending,
Congress passed the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of
1996 which contains a provision restricting judicial review of the Attorney General's
"decision or action" to "commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal
orders against any alien under this Act." The issue before us is whether, as petition-
ers contend, this provision deprives the federal courts of jurisdiction over respon-
dents' suit.5
Justice Scalia then provides an abbreviated account6 of the history of the
American-Arab litigation, which focuses on procedures: the government's
institution and re-institution of deportation proceedings, the aliens' respon-
sive lawsuits, and two key holdings in the Ninth Circuit. The Court almost
completely ignores the substantive basis for the aliens' claims. 7 Instead,
Justice Scalia recounts a simple tale in which the government identifies and
then seeks to deport seven Palestinians and one Kenyan as members of "the
[PFLP], a group that the government characterizes as an international ter-
rorist and communist organization." Initially, the government proceeded
under provisions of "the McCarran-Walter Act, which, though now re-
pealed, provided at the time for the deportation of aliens who 'advocate...
5. American-Arab, 119 S. Ct. at 938 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
6. As the Court notes:
Since this suit seeking to prevent the initiation of deportation proceedings was filed
- in 1987, during the administration of Attorney General Edwin Meese - it has
made four trips through the District Court for the Central District of California and
the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. The first two concerned ju-
risdictional issues not now before us.
Id. at 939 (citations omitted).
7. See id. (ignoring substantive basis for aliens' claims).
8. Id. at 938.
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world communism.' 9 But the government did not stop there: "In addition,
the INS charged the first six, who were only temporary residents, with rou-
tine status violations such as overstaying a visa and failure to maintain stu-
dent status."' 0
The eight aliens contested initiation of deportation proceedings on the
ground that it targeted constitutionally-protected political association and
free speech." The Court noted further:
INS regional counsel William Odencrantz said at a press conference that the charges
had been changed for tactical reasons but the INS was still seeking respondents' de-
portation because of their affiliation with the PFLP .... Respondents amended their
complaint to include an allegation that the INS was selectively enforcing immigration
laws against them in violation of their First and Fifth Amendment rights.'
2
In addition, the government had to contend with a busy Congress, which
kept amending the Immigration and Nationality Act. Undaunted, the Jus-
tice Department persisted in its attempt to remove the eight. Over the next
three years, it amended its original charges or substituted new ones several
times.
b. The Broader Legal and Factual Context
The aliens who sued the government in 1987 were labeled the "LA 8"
because they resided in Los Angeles and had been targeted for deportation
by the District Director of the INS Los Angeles Office. Within the eight,
there were important distinctions. Two of the plaintiffs - Khader Hamide
and Michel Shehadeh - were permanent resident aliens. The "Other Six,"
all of whom had been admitted as non-immigrants, actually consisted of
two groups. In the first group, Aiad Barakat and Naim Sharif had resided
in the United States for at least five years and had already filed papers to
"legalize" their status and become permanent residents under the provisions
of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986.13 The remaining four
- Bashar Amer, Julie Mungai, Amjad Obeid and Ayman Obeid - had
been admitted but were not eligible for "legalization." The suit, which all
eight filed in April 1987, initially was not a "targeting" or "selective en-
forcement" suit at all. Instead, it directly challenged the relevant provisions
9. Id. (emphasis added).
10. Id. at 939.
11. Justice Scalia makes no mention of the fact, but the eight charged aliens also im-
mediately began demanding information from the government about the sources of its in-
formation.
12. American-Arab, 119 S. Ct. at 939 (citation omitted).
13. Pub. L. No. 99-603, § 201(b), 100 Stat. 3394 (codified at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1422-1427
(1994)) (providing for adjustment of status only to certain aliens who had entered the United
States prior to January 1, 1982, and had already lost lawful status by that date).
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of the 1952 Act, arguing that they were unconstitutional "on their face" or
"as applied," since they denied resident aliens the same expressive and as-
sociational rights guaranteed to United States citizens by the First Amend-
ment.'
4
However, two events transformed the suit into one that put primary em-
phasis on "selective enforcement." First, Hamide and Shehadeh - who
remained in deportation proceedings only because of their alleged member-
ship in, or affiliation with, the PFLP - were not permitted to maintain
their "facial" and "as applied" challenge because the district court, fol-
lowed by the Ninth Circuit, found that such a challenge was not yet justici-
able.15 Second, the statement of Odencrantz, and others by former FBI Di-
14. In relevant part, title 8, section 1251 of the United States Code provided:
(a) Any alien in the United States ... shall, upon order of the Attorney General, be
deported who -
(6) is or at any time has been, after entry, a member of the following classes of aliens:
(D) Aliens not within any of the other provisions of this paragraph who advocate the
economic, international, and governmental doctrines of world communism or the es-
tablishment in the United States of a totalitarian dictatorship, or who are members of
or affiliated with any organization that advocates the economic, international, and
governmental doctrines of world communism or the establishment in the United
States of a totalitarian dictatorship, either through its own utterances or through any
written or printed publications issued or published by or with the permission or con-
sent of or under the authority of such organization or paid for by the funds of, or
funds furnished by, such organization;
(F) Aliens who advocate or teach or who are members of or affiliated with any or-
ganization that advocates or teaches...
(iii) the unlawful damage, injury, or destruction of property;
(G) Aliens who write or publish, or cause to be written or published, or who know-
ingly circulate, distribute, print, or display, or knowingly cause to be circulated, dis-
tributed, printed, published, or displayed, or who knowingly have in their possession
for the purpose of circulation, publication, distribution, or display, any written or
printed matter, advocating or teaching opposition to all organized government, or ad-
vocating or teaching...
(v) the economic, international, and governmental doctrines of world commu-
nism or the establishment in the United States of a totalitarian dictatorship;
(H) Aliens who are members of or affiliated with any organization that writes, circu-
lates, distributes, prints, publishes, or displays, or causes to be written, circulated,
distributed, printed, published, or displayed, or that has in its possession for the pur-
pose of circulation, distribution, publication, issue, or display any written or printed
matter of the character described in paragraph (G) of this subdivision.
8 U.S.C. § 125 1(a)(6) (1988).
15. See American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. v. Thornburgh, 970 F.2d 501, 510
(9th Cir. 1991) (concluding first amendment challenges not ripe for review); American-Arab
Anti-Discrimination Comm. v. Meese, 714 F. Supp. 1060, 1063 (C.D. Cal. 1989) (noting




rector William Webster, convinced the Other Six that the "technical"
status-offender charges which the Immigration and Naturalization Service
(INS) retained were entirely pretextual, masking a continuing intent to de-
port them because of their alleged membership in, or affiliation with, the
PFLP.
2. Phase Two: 1990 - 1995
a. The Court's Opinion
While much happened between 1990 and 1994, the Court does not linger
over the details. Instead, Justice Scalia's account moves us quickly to a
few key events in 1994 and 1995:
In 1994, the District Court preliminarily enjoined deportation proceedings against the
six temporary residents, holding that they were likely to prove that the INS did not
enforce routine status requirements against immigrants who were not members of dis-
favored terrorist groups and that the possibility of deportation, combined with the
chill to their First Amendment rights while the proceedings were pending, constituted
irreparable injury. With regard to Hamide and Shehadeh's claims, however, the Dis-
trict Court granted summary judgment to the federal parties for reasons not pertinent
here.
American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee v. Reno, a case that we shall call
"AA[A]DC I" was the Ninth Circuit's first merits determination in this case, uphold-
ing the injunction as to the six and reversing the District Court with regard to Hamide
and Shehadeh. The opinion rejected the Attorney General's argument that selec-
tive-enforcement claims are inappropriate in the immigration context, and her alter-
native argument that the special statutory-review provision of the Immigration and
Nationality Act (INA) precluded review of such a claim until a deportation order is-
sued. The Ninth Circuit remanded the case to the District Court, which entered an
injunction in favor of Hamide and Shehadeh and denied the Attorney General's re-
quest that the existing injunction be dissolved in light of new evidence that all re-
spondents participated in fundraising activities of the PFLP.
6
b. The Broader Legal and Factual Context
Justice Scalia's account is remarkably spare. It accurately portrays the
legal situation of the LA 8 on the eve of the passage of the Illegal Immi-
gration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA).17
However, it ignores, or glosses over, governmental actions and judicial
findings that persuaded the Ninth Circuit to finally reach the merits of the
case six years after the first hearings were conducted.
16. American-Arab, 119 S. Ct. at 939-40 (citations omitted).
17. Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (codified at scattered sections of U.S.C.).
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For at least some of the.eight aliens facing deportation, a merits determi-
nation was possible much earlier. Indeed, in 1989 the District Court con-
cluded that:
[T]he Other Six . . have standing to challenge the [1952 Act] provisions. On the
merits, we hold that aliens who are legally within the United States are protected by
the First Amendment of the United States Constitution and that this protection is not
limited in the deportation arena by the Government's plenary immigration power.
Applying established First Amendment principles, we find that the [1952 Act's] pro-
visions are substantially overbroad in violation of the First Amendment. We there-
fore grant Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and request for declaratory re-
lief.18
The finding and grant of standing, however, was nullified by the Ninth Cir-
cuit in 1991 when the court held that the aliens'. First Amendment chal-
lenges were not ripe for 'review.19  Undeterred, the aliens sued again.
20
Four years later, the Ninth Circuit found on the merits that all eight of the
aliens were protected by the First Amendment, and that they were likely to
succeed on their claim.
21
Finding that each claim was ripe for review, the Ninth Circuit not only
upheld a preliminary injunction granted by the district court on behalf of
the Other Six, it also reversed that court's determination that it lacked ju-
risdiction to review Hamide's and Shehadeh's selective enforcement claim,
and remanded that facet of the case back to the district court for review.
22
i. The Judicial Change of Heart: New Insight into "Ripeness " and
"Exhaustion Remedies "?
In its 1991 decision, the Ninth Circuit based its ripeness holding on three
principal grounds. First, it looked to the absence of a fully-developed fac-
tual record.23 Second, it pointed to the fact that there was no "benefit of the
18. Meese, 714 F. Supp. at 1063.
19. See Thornburgh, 970 F.2d at 510 (finding First Amendment challenge not ripe for
review).
20. Resjudicata did not apply because the later suit was filed after the INS commenced
new proceedings against permanent resident aliens Hamide and Shehadeh under the 'terror-
ist activity' provision of the Immigration Act of 1990 (IMMACT), Pub. L. No. 101-649, §
602(a)(a)(4)(B), 104 Stat. 4978 (1990) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(4)(B)
(1994)).
21. See American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. v. Reno (AAADC 1), 70 F.3d
1045, 1066 (9th Cir. 1995) (finding evidence of impermissibly motivated enforcement of
immigration laws and strong likelihood of success on claim that the INS has selectively en-
forced the immigration laws).
22. See id. at 1071 (finding district court had subject matter jurisdiction and remanding
case for consideration on selective enforcement claims).
23. As the court noted:
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INS's interpretations of the challenged provisions. '24 Implicit in this ar-
gument is the notion that such interpretations would delineate the circum-
stances under which the government would most likely seek to deploy the
1952 Act's ideological deportation provisions, and might take the opportu-
nity "to correct its own mistakes and apply its expertise. '  Third, the
Ninth Circuit discounted the hardship that the individual appellees might
suffer:
Finally, we believe that any hardship suffered by the individual appellees resulting
from our decision to delay resolution of their claims does not amount to a justification
for us to exercise jurisdiction. The individual appellees are not now charged under
the challenged provisions. Moreover, if charged and found deportable for violation
of the challenged provisions, the individual appellees will have the opportunity to
present their constitutional challenges to a court. We therefore do not have a case in
which "delayed resolution of these issues would foreclose any relief from the present
injury suffered by appellees.26
Four years later, the Ninth Circuit distinguished its earlier holding in the
case on several grounds. First, it noted "that the perpetual threat of depor-
tation based on group affiliation constitutes the kind of irreparable injury
that is relevant to the ripeness inquiry here." 27 Second, the court agreed
with the Other Six that exhaustion of administrative remedies would be a
futile exercise because the INS does not have jurisdiction to review a se-
lective enforcement claim.28 More broadly, the court found that the Board
of Immigration Appeals (BIA) lacks the authority to hear any constitutional
claims.29 This finding of limited agency jurisdiction is fully consistent with
prevailing case law, 30 and was specifically endorsed in Justice Scalia's
opinion in the instant case.3' Third, the Ninth Circuit noted that:
This case has come to us upon a sketchy record and with many unknown facts.
Given the procedural posture of the case, the facts understandably have not been
well-developed. As a result, we do not know, for example, whether the appellees are
actually members of the PFLP or what specific acts the government alleges the ap-
pellees to have committed in violation of the challenged provisions. In such situa-
tions, the Supreme Court has indicated that we ought not to exercise jurisdiction.
Thornburgh, 970 F.2d at 510-Il.
24. Id. at 511.
25. Id. (quoting FTC v. Standard Oil Co., 449 U.S. 232, 242 (1980)).
26. Id. (citations omitted).
27. AAADC 1, 70 F.3d at 1058.
28. See id. (citing Lopez-Telles v. INS, 564 F.2d 1304 (9th Cir. 1977)) (finding ex-
haustion of administrative remedies to be futile under circumstances).
29. This is an inference drawn from the court's citation to Xiao v. Barr, 979 F.2d 151,
154 (9th Cir. 1992). See AAADC I. 70 F.3d at 1058 ("If the agency lacks the authority to
resolve the constitutional claims, there is little point in requiring exhaustion.").
30. See generally Xiao, 979 F.2d at 156 (finding within province of immigration judge
to determine jurisdiction).
31. See Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. (American-Arab), 119 S.
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We customarily decline to apply the prudential ripeness doctrine when exhaustion
would be a futile attempt to challenge a fixed agency position. Other circuits have
similarly found exhaustion futile unless "there is genuine doubt as to what is going to
happen in the administrative process."
32
Finally, the Ninth Circuit purported to find a lesser need to rely on a fully-
developed factual record after the new filing:
[Ojur earlier opinion in this case is not dispositive here. We held that prudential con-
cerns weighed against the district court's assuming jurisdiction of the unconstitu-
tional-as-applied challenge to the 1952 Act, because the factual record developed in
the agency proceeding to support the application of the statute would assist our re-
view of that claim. In contrast, this case does not involve a facial or as-applied chal-
lenge to a statute.
33
Each of the first three arguments could (and should) have been made by
the Ninth Circuit in 1991 to defeat the government's "not yet ripe" defense.
The fourth argument is not convincing on its face, since a selective en-
forcement claim almost certainly requires more factual development than a
"facial or as-applied challenge to a statute. 34
ii. A Better Answer: "Reality Bytes"
Litigation is not simply about law - it is about law and facts, about the
way that people and incorporeal bodies, including governmental agencies,
act and interact, and about the limitations that statutes, courts, and the Con-
stitution impose on their conduct. A better explanation for the Ninth Cir-
cuit's about-face probably lies in a developing awareness that the govern-
ment's case against the LA 8 was factually weak, was being pursued for
political rather than "national security" reasons, inflicted real harm on peo-
ple with very limited ability to protect their own interests, undermined im-
portant constitutional values, and was likely to go on forever unless the ju-
diciary moved to stop it.
This awareness almost certainly had its roots in three principal sources.
First, a gauntlet of statutes tailored to disadvantage Palestinians and gov-
ernmental initiatives intended to put those statutes into effect, which im-
Ct. 936, 940 (1999) ("[N]either the Immigration Judge nor the Board of Immigration Ap-
peals has authority to hear [selective enforcement] claims.").
32. AAADC1, 70 F.3d at 1058 (quoting Rafeedie v. INS, 880 F.2d 506, 514 (D.C. Cir.
1989)).
33. Id. (citations omitted).
34. Indeed, the court virtually acknowledged this fact when it stated, "[tihe govern-
ment's argument that the selective enforcement claim in this case is 'purely legal' and thus
reviewable only in the court of appeals is unpersuasive. Both prongs of the selective en-




posed ever-higher barriers at a time when Congress was questioning the le-
gitimacy of "ideological" grounds for exclusion or deportation. Second, a
close examination of the INS's use of confidential information that oc-
curred both because the LA 8 pressed for information about its use in the
case against them and because the government sought to use such informa-
tion to deny legalization to Barakat and Sharif. Third, a substantial body of
evidence was developed in the principal case, indicating that the govern-
ment was in fact selectively targeting supporters of the Palestinian Libera-
tion Organization (PLO) for deportation. Feedback from other courts
probably tended to confirm these insights.
(1) The Emerging Legislative Dichotomy
The United States has a long history of demonizing certain aliens and
certain elements of the foreign population in its midst. For more than two
centuries, it labeled people as "Un-American" because of their beliefs and
their speech, and unsuccessfully sought to limit immigration on that basis.
The Alien Act of 1798 authorized the deportation of aliens whom the
President judged "dangerous to the peace and safety of the United States.",35
Two years later, before it had ever been enforced, Congress permitted it to
lapse.36 Throughout the nineteenth century, nativists sought to deny immi-
grants the right to naturalize as a means of discouraging their entry. Writ-
ing in 1835, Samuel F.W.B. Morse decried the negative "influence of for-
eign movements upon us, in the great contest between liberty and
despotism."'" His particular target was "[floreigners from the various
Catholic countries of Europe, 38 and "human priest-controlled machines.,
39
Morse further asserted:
[Nlaturalization has become door of entrance not alone to the ever welcome lovers of
liberty, but also for the priest-ridden troops of the Holy Alliance, with their Jesuit of-
ficers well skilled in all the arts of darkness. Now emigrants are selected for a service
to their tyrants; not for their affinity to liberty, but for their mental servitude, and their
docility in obeying the orders of their priests.
40
35. Act of July 6, 1798, ch. 66, 1 Stat. 577.
36. See THOMAS ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF & DAvID A. MARTIN, IMMIGRATION PROCESS
AND POLICY 475 (2d ed. 1991) ("[This] section was apparently never invoked and was al-
lowed to expire two years later.").
37. SAMUEL F.W.B. MORSE, IMMINENT DANGERS TO THE FREE INSTITUTIONS OF THE
UNITED STATES THROUGH FOREIGN IMMIGRATION 5 (1835), reprinted in 19 THE AMERICAN
IMMIGRATION COLLECTION (1969).
38. Id. at 12.
39. Id. at iv.
40. Id. at 28.
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Identifying the newcomers as a "foreign turbulence,' '4 strangers to "our
own institutions'4 2 and not "well versed in the nature of American lib-
erty, '43 he asked, "[c]an one throw mud into pure water and not disturb its
clearness?"
4
Later in the century, the anti-foreign animus focused first on the Irish,
and later on immigrants from central and eastern Europe. Fierce competi-
tion in the labor market and ethnic prejudice played major roles. It was
common, for example, to dismiss the Irish as wild, lazy, or drunken
"Celts." Yet nativist politicians tended to ignore these cultural stereotypes
in their quest for anti-Catholic legislation. The Irish were frequently identi-
fied as the worst sort of Catholic; but their great flaw was their Catholi-
cism, not their Irishness. In the end, "the nativist ideologues did not make
much effort to tap [the] sentiment" of anti-Irish "ethnic prejudice. ' 45 Some
nativists focused instead on their "foreignness," equating them with in-
tending French, German or Swiss immigrants. Most relied, however, on
the time-tested rhetoric of anti-Catholicism and its fundamental assumption
that all followers of the Pope were inherently incapable of "good citizen-
ship" in a freedom-loving republic. 4 6 In the 1880s and 1890s, similar ar-
guments - which now included a "biological" component - were made
alleging that the "new" immigrants from eastern and central Europe were
incapable of understanding or abiding by "American" values.
4 7
In 1903, however, Congress finally took action. Responding to the as-
sassination of William McKinley by a native-born American of Polish par-
41. Id. at iv.
42. Id. at 12.
43. MORSE, supra note 37, at 12.
44. Id. at iv.
45. DALE T. KNOBEL, PADDY AND THE REPUBLIC 137 (1986).
46. See id. at 135-37 (1986) (describing role of anti-Catholicism). See generally RAY
ALLEN BILLINGTON, THE PROTESTANT CRUSADE 1800-1860: A STUDY OF THE ORIGINS OF
AMERICAN NATIVISM (1952) (providing fullest account of sources and manifestations of
anti-Catholic prejudice in antebellum America).
47. See KITTY CALAViTA, U.S. IMMIGRATION LAW AND THE CONTROL OF LABOR: 1820-
1924 105-06 (1984).
Capitalists had long explained labor unrest and class cleavages by insisting that they
were imported by foreigners who knew nothing of American ideals. Some trade
journals even argued that more selective immigration might defuse militant unionism
by barring foreign agitators. Many industry journals began to adopt the New England
elite's convenient physiological explanation of the immigrant as troublemaker. "An-
archism is a blood disease," reported a leading business magazine after the Haymar-
ket affair [in 1886]. In 1890, [another] wrote, "We are absorbing the vicious and dis-




entage,48 Congress enacted a new measure that authorized the exclusion of
"anarchists, or persons who believe in or advocate the overthrow by force
or violence of the government of the United States or of all government or
of all forms of law, or the assassination of public officials."49 Almost im-
mediately, the government used this provision to remove John Turner, a re-
cently-arrived Englishman who had delivered a speech in New York pre-
dicting and "look[ing] forward to a general strike in Europe which will
spread over the industrial world." 50 His appeal reached the Supreme Court,
which rejected a First Amendment challenge to the Acti' Until 1990,
Congress maintained similar anti-anarchist provisions.
48. McKinley was shot on September 6, 1901, and died on September 14. His assassin
was Leon Czolgosz, "an anarchist." See 7 THE NEW ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA 639-40
(1998).
49. Act of March 3, 1903, ch. 1012, § 2, 32 Stat. 1213, 1214; see also ch. 1012, § 38,
32 Stat. 1213, 1221.
That no person who disbelieves in, or who is opposed to, all organized government,
or who is a member of or affiliated with any organization entertaining and teaching
such disbelief in or opposition to all organized government, or who advocates or
teaches the duty, necessity, or propriety of the unlawful assaulting or killing of any
officer or officers, either of specific individuals or of officers generally, of the Gov-
ernment of the United States or of any other organized government, because of his or
their official character, shall be permitted to enter the United States or any Territory
or place subject to the jurisdiction thereof.
Id.
Neither section of the Act of March 3, 1903, granted explicit authority to deport any-
body on these grounds. Nevertheless, as the case of Turner v. Williams, 194 U.S. 279
(1904), demonstrated, the government used the statute to remove aliens who had already
landed. That result is peculiar, since the Supreme Court had recognized the distinction be-
tween excludable and deportable aliens, and of the enhanced constitutional rights afforded
to the latter, a year earlier, in the case of Yamataya v. Fisher (Japanese Immigrant Case),
189 U.S. 86 (1903).
50. Turner, 194 U.S. at 283. At the time he was arrested, Turner was in possession of
"a list of his proposed series of lectures," one of which was entitled, "The Essentials of An-
archism." See id.; see also Kevin R. Johnson, The Antiterrorism Act, the Immigration Re-
form Act, and Ideological Regulation in the Immigration Laws: Important Lessons for Citi-
zens and Noncitizens, 28 ST. MARY's L.J. 833, 844-45 (1997) (discussing fears surrounding
McKinley assassination and Turner).
51. See Turner, 194 U.S. at 292-95 (rejecting First Amendment challenge). The ma-
jority appears to have found the Act of March 3, 1903, constitutional on its face. Justice
Brewer found the Act constitutional as applied. See id. at 295 (Brewer, J., concurring).
It is not an unreasonable deduction therefrom that petitioner is an anarchist in the
commonly accepted sense of the term, - one who urges and seeks the overthrow by
force of all government. If that be not the fact. he should have introduced testimony
to establish the contrary. It is unnecessary, therefore, to consider what rights he
would have if he were only what is called, by way of differentiation, a philosophical
anarchist, - one who simply entertains and expresses the opinion that all govern-
ment is a mistake, and that society would be better off without any.
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During World War I and after the outbreak of the Russian Revolution,
however, Congress shifted its attention to Marxists and those seeking to
advance the goals of "World Communism" in any way, shape, manner, or
form.52 Americans had been deeply distrustful of the Russian Revolution
from its inception and had supported early attempts to overthrow it militar-
ily. Most stood behind Attorney General A. Mitchell Palmer in 1919 when
he used the immigration laws to imprison thousands of aliens (and to de-
port over five hundred) whom he identified as "Reds" about "'to rise up
and destroy the government at one fell swoop."'
53
When Congress initially enacted the 1952 Act, its ideological target was
the same as it had been in 1917. The 1952 Act preserved features of turn-
of-the-century and World War I legislation, but was primarily a codifica-
tion of internal security acts enacted in 1940 and 1950.54
Id.
52. See Robert Plotkin, First Amendment Challenges to the Membership and Advocacy
Provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 10 GEO. IMMIGR.
L.J. 623, 627 (1996). Robert Plotkin notes:
The first modem wave of First Amendment litigation arose out of federal legislation
passed during World War I and in its aftermath. United States involvement in the
War and the concurrent Bolshevik Revolution in Russia created a national mood of
great anxiety and fear of foreigners, Communists, and others viewed as subversive
both to the war effort and to the nation as a whole. The first such piece of legislation
passed in response to the perceived need to prevent the spread of Communism within
the United States and the disruption of the war effort was the Espionage Act of 1917.
The Act prohibited, inter alia, during wartime: (1) causing or attempting to cause in-
subordination in the [United States] military forces, (2) obstructing or conspiring to
obstruct the recruiting and enlistment service of the United States, and (3) using or
conspiring to use the mails for the transmission of materials declared to be non-
mailable by the Postmaster General.
Id. at 627.
53. JOHN HIGHAM, STRANGERS IN THE LAND: PATTERNS OF AMERICAN NATIVISM, 1860-
1925 229 (1955) (quoting Louis F. POST, THE DEPORTATIONS DELERIUM OF NINETEEN-
TWENTY: A PERSONAL NARRATIVE OF AN HISTORIC OFFICIAL EXPERIENCE (1970)); see also
THOMAS ALEXANDER ALIENIKOFF & DAVID A. MARTIN, IMMIGRATION: PROCESS AND POLICY
352-55 (1985).
54. The Internal Security Act of 1950 (ISA), ch. 1024, 64 Stat. 987, included a lengthy
section which was intended "to deny entry to all alien Communists, Communist Sympathiz-
ers, and allied classes." See E.P. HUTCHINSON, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF AMERICAN
IMMIGRATION POLICY 1798-1965 426-27 (1981) (discussing purpose and provisions of ISA
of 1950).
The Alien Registration Act of June 28, 1940, ch. 439, § 2, 54 Stat. 670, 671, rendered
it unlawful to advocate in any way the overthrow of the United States. See HUTCHINSON,
supra, at 258 (noting Alien Registration Act's provision making it "unlawful to advocate in
any way the overthrow of the Government of the United States"). Most of the 1952 Act's
anti-subversive provisions were identical to those enunciated in the ISA.
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The Cold War sharpened fears about communist subversion and "un-
American activities." From the late 1940s into the 1950s, the government
pursued criminal prosecutions and immigration proceedings against present
and former resident communists and those suspected of Communist Party
membership or ties. 55 Several Supreme Court cases found in favor of the
alien, holding that under the Court's interpretation of the underlying stat-
utes, there was not enough evidence to subject the aliens to deportation or
denial of naturalization. 6 In only one case, Harisiades v. Shaughnessy,"
did the Court squarely address possible First Amendment limits to the de-
portation power. In that case, the Court found that the First Amendment
did apply and that it required the Court "to determine whether ambiguous
speech is advocacy of political methods or subtly shades into a methodical
but prudent incitement to violence."58 Finding that the activities of the
three petitioners fell into the latter category, the Court upheld the petition-
ers' deportations.5 9 Well into the 1970s and 1980s, the ideological grounds
for excluding and deporting aliens continued to be directed primarily at
persons like the late Ernest Mandel or Hortensia Allende, whom the gov-
ernment identified as advocating communism or belonging to organizations
affiliated with the Communist Party.6 °
Yet beginning about 1970, political violence that had its roots in the
Middle East, Ireland, and Central America initiated profound attitudinal
changes in the United States. Widely-publicized attacks launched by Pal-
55. Sometimes the government pursued multiple actions against a single alien. See
Maurice A. Roberts, The Harry Bridges Cases, 76 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1385 (1999). He
reflects:
During my long career in the Department of Justice, no project or case involving an
individual took up more of my time than the series of cases involving left-wing labor
leader Harry Bridges. The government sought unsuccessfully over a period of two
decades to deport him, to prosecute him criminally for perjury in obtaining naturali-
zation, and finally to revoke his naturalization in plenary denaturalization proceed-
ings.
Id.
56. See, e.g., Gastelum-Quinones v. Kennedy, 374 U.S. 469 (1963); Rowoldt v. Per-
fetto, 355 U.S. 115 (1957); Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135 (1945).
57. 342 U.S. 580 (1952).
58. Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 592 (1952).
59. See id. at 592, 596 (upholding deportations).
60. See Kliendienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972) (seeking to obtain nonimmigrant
visa despite communist beliefs); Allende v. Schultz, 845 F.2d 1111 (Ist Cir. 1988) (con-
testing denial of visa under statute that permits exclusion of aliens who engage in activities
that endanger security of United States). For detailed listings of the more notorious names
who have been ordered excluded, see STEPHEN LEGOMSKY, IMMIGRATION LAW AND POLICY
332 (1992), and John A. Scanlan, Aliens in the Marketplace of Ideas: The Government, The
Academy, and the McCarran- Walter Act, 66 TExAS L. REV. 1481, 1497 & n.75 (1988).
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estinians and by fundamentalist Muslims had particular impact. These in-
cluded the killing of eleven members of the Israeli Olympic team by the
Black September Organization in Munich in 1972; the attack on a United
States barracks in Lebanon by Islamic Jihad that killed 241 Marines in
1983; and the hijacking of the Italian cruise liner Achille Lauro and subse-
quent murder of Leon Klinghoffer by four Palestinian guerrillas in 1985.61
As the prospect of Soviet domination faded, fears of communist "subver-
sives" quickly gave way to fears of "terrorists." 62
The growth in interest, however, was not confined to academics. Writ-
ing in the late 1980s, Edward Said observed:
As a word and concept, "terrorism" has acquired an extraordinary status in American
public discourse. It has displaced Communism as public enemy number one, al-
though there are frequent efforts to tie the two together. It has spawned uses of lan-
guage, rhetoric and argument that are frightening in their capacity for mobilizing
opinion, gaining legitimacy and provoking various sorts of murderous action. 63
Four years later, Lawrence Howard noted:
The phenomenon of terrorism has become a major concern of the American public.
The Reagan administration elevated it to the foremost foreign policy problem of the
nation. The American and Canadian publics consider terrorism to be a greater threat
to their personal safety than driving on the freeways and working at their jobs, worse
even than the risk of nuclear war. However, these same people are much more at risk
from their jobs and their daily commute than they are from terrorist attacks - by or-
ders of magnitude ... [I]n 1985 a total of twenty-three U.S. citizens died in terrorist
incidents around the world, one quarter the number killed that year by lightning. Ter-
rorism, abhorrent as it is, is largely a symbolic threat to America.6
61. See Dave Martella, Comment, Defending the Land of the Free and the Home of the
Fearful: The Use of Classified Information to Deport Suspected Terrorists, 7 AM. U. J.
INT'L L. & POLY 951, 953 (1992) (noting certain paradigmatic terrorist incidents which oc-
curred before the government commenced deportation proceedings against the LA 8 and the
1988 bombing of Pan Am Flight 103, which killed 270 people, including 181 United States
citizens, and was a key incident occurring during the proceedings).
62. See DAVID C. RAPOPORT, INSIDE TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS I (David C. Rapoport
ed., 1988). David Rapoport notes:
In 1969 when I began to prepare a series of lecture.., entitled Assassination and Ter-
rorism, I struggled to find appropriate materials but could only discover a handful of
items. Seventeen years later, Amos Lakos published a bibliography on the same
subjects which contained 5,622 items in English alone! Has any academic enterprise
ever grown so much in so short a time?
Id.
63. EDWARD SAID, The Essential Terrorist, in BLAMING THE VICTIMS: SPURIOUS
SCHOLARSHIP AND THE PALESTNIAN QUESTION 149 (Edward Said & Christopher Hitchins
eds., 1988).
64. LAWRENCE HOWARD, TERRORISM: ROOTS, IMPACT, RESPONSES I (Lawrence How-
ard ed., 1992).
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But even symbolic threats require poster children. According to Howard,
"[t]he phenomenon of terrorism is ... often associated in the public's mind
with radical Palestinians or members of fundamentalist Islamic groups who
wreak spiteful acts of terror against the innocent to fulfill the commands of
the Koran." 6 When some of these same people announce their implacable
opposition to the State of Israel, when some are implicated in attacks on Is-
raeli citizens, when some espouse a Marxist view of history, or when, as in
the 1980s, some ally themselves with Iran, symbolically they come across
as more than potential suicide bombers. Instead, they are perceived as op-
ponents of American interests and enemies of the United States.
So it is not entirely surprising that beginning in the 1970s, the govern-
ment began to use existing ideological provisions of the 1952 Act to target
Arabs generally, and Palestinians more particularly. Members of the PFLP
were particularly easy targets, since the PFLP historically has been com-
mitted, not only to the "liberation" of Palestine, but also to secular restruc-
turing of society in accordance with Marxist theory.66 The LA 8 were not
the only Palestinians and supporters of the PLO who were targeted, nor
were they the only members of the PFLP. The American-Arab Anti-
Discrimination Committee estimates that several dozen people, at a mini-
mum, have been singled out for exclusion or deportation because they have
been identified as members or supporters of the PLO. Seven years after the
American-Arab proceedings commenced, the INS initiated exclusion pro-
ceedings against Faoud Rafeedie, Tarak Mustafa, and Sulieman Shihadeh
on the ground that three had traveled to Syria to "attend the First Confer-
ence of the Palestine Youth Organization [(PYO)], ' '67 "a group closely as-
sociated with the [PFLP]."6' But the LA 8 were among the first so tar-
geted, and almost certainly the first to launch a full-fledged counter-attack
in the courts.
As Palestinians, however, they quickly discovered that they needed to
overcome special statutory difficulties. Facing deportation because of their
associations and beliefs in 1987, ordinarily they would have been encour-
aged by the direction of recent and still on-going congressional initiatives.
As early as 1977, Congress began to back away from ideological grounds
for excluding aliens. Committed by the Helsinki Accords 69 to the principle
of free movement of people across borders, Congress became acutely
65. Id. at 3.
66. See MATTI STEINBERG, The Worldview of Habash's 'Popular Front', THE
JERuSALEM Q., Summer 1998, at 3 (explaining PFLP ideology).
67. Rafeedie v. INS, 880 F.2d 506, 509 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
68. Rafeedie v. INS, 795 F. Supp. 13, 16 (D.D.C. 1992).
69. Conference on Security & Cooperation in Europe, Final Act, Helsinki, 1975, 73
DEP'T ST. BULL. 323 (1975).
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aware that the practice of denying access to people on ideological grounds
undercut its efforts to persuade the Soviet Union to abide by the principle
of "free emigration."7 ° Congress therefore enacted the so-called "McGov-
ern Amendment," which imposed stringent reporting and approval re-
quirements on the State Department every time it denied a waiver of the
ideological grounds of exclusion to an intending non-immigrant.7' In 1987,
Congress allowed the McGovern Amendment to expire. In its stead, Con-
gress adopted section 901 of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act for
Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989 (FRAA)." The provision, which was in effect
for fourteen months, provided that:
Notwithstanding any other provisions of law, no alien may be denied a visa or ex-
cluded from admission into the United States,... or subjected to deportation because
of any past, current, or expected beliefs, statements, or associations which, if engaged
in by a United States citizen in the United States, would be protected under the Con-
stitution of the United States."
Describing the purpose of section 901, the House Conference Committee
noted that:
[C]urrent law provides authority to the executive branch to deny admission to aliens
or to deport them on a variety of grounds including those related to national security,
ideological or political beliefs, and, more generally, the interests of the United States.
These provisions, since their codification in 1952 as part of the Immigration and Na-
tionality Act, have been used by the executive branch to deny aliens entry into the
United states on the basis not only of their potential threat to the national security in-
terests of the United States or their past involvement in criminal activity, but also on
the basis of their expression of beliefs, their advocacy of political positions, or their
70. David Carliner, United States Compliance with the Helsinki Final Act: The Treat-
ment of Aliens, 13 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 397, 401-02 (1980) (discussing United States'
compliance record with regard to Helsinki Accords).
71. See 22 U.S.C. § 2691(a) (1982) (original version at ch. 841, § 112, 91 Stat. 848,
Pub. L. No. 95-105 (Aug. 17, 1977), amended by Pub. L. No. 95-426, § 119, 92 Stat. 970
(Oct. 7, 1978) and Pub. L. No. 96-60, § 109, 93 Stat. 397 (Aug. 15, 1979)) (requiring, in
most circumstances, Secretary of State to recommend that Attorney General grant approval
necessary for issuance of visa to nonimmigrant alien otherwise excludible by reason of
membership in proscribed organization).
72. Pub. L. No. 100-204, § 901(a), 101 Stat. 1399, 1400 (1987) (codified at 8 U.S.C. §
1182 note (1994)).
73. Id. The FRAA was later amended to protect only "non-immigrants." See Pub. L.
No. 100-461, § 555, 102 Stat. 2268-36 (1988) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1182 note
(1994)).
As originally enacted, section 901(a) temporarily suspended the enforcement of most
of the McCarran-Walter Act ideological provisions for both immigrant and non-immigrant
aliens. However, section 901(b) limited the scope of this suspension. Thus, members of the
Palestine Liberation Organization [PLO] were denied the benefits of the Act. As amended




association in political organizations which would be constitutionally protected if en-
gaged in by [United States] citizens within the United States. 4
These practices, the committee indicated, were objectionable for several
reasons:
The committee of conference notes that as a result of this history of visa denial, the
citizens of the United states have been denied the opportunity to have access to the
full spectrum of international opinion, and the reputation of the United States as an
open society, tolerant of divergent ideas, has suffered ... [T]he committee of confer-
ence believes that, in order to make it clear that the United States is not fearful of for-
eign ideas or criticism or the individuals who espouse such ideas, a thorough reform
of the grounds for exclusion and deportation is long overdue. Furthermore, the com-
mittee of conference observes that some of the grounds for exclusion and deportation
may be at variance with U.S. international obligations as expressed in the Helsinki
Accords.75
Rather than undertaking the proposed "thorough reform," Congress in-
stead adopted an interim approach:
The conference substitute continues to permit the denial of visas or the deportation of
aliens when it is in the interests of the United States, but makes it clear that it is not in
the interests of the United States to establish one standard of ideology for citizens and
another for foreigners who wish to visit the United States. Accordingly, under [sec-
tion 901] the executive branch would retain the ability to exclude or deport aliens on
criminal, espionage, and terrorism grounds (among others), and, in certain circum-
stances, on national security and foreign policy grounds. But national security or for-
eign policy exclusion or deportation would not be permitted if such exclusion or de-
portation were based on beliefs, statements, or associations which would be
constitutionally protected if engaged in by [United States] citizens in the United
States. Under this section, statements would be construed as including writings and
other forms of non-verbal communications.76
Yet Congress's reluctance to establish a "double standard" of ideology
had its limits. The conference report noted three, only two of which are
relevant here. First, section 901 offered no protection to "an individual
who has committed or who is likely to engage, after entry, in terrorist ac-
tivity." "Terrorist activity" was broadly defined as:
[T]he intent of the managers to include persons involved in hostage taking. kid-
nap[p]ing, threatened violence or other acts which do not actually involve death or
injury. These acts, whether or not they result in bodily harm, are a form of violence
and are crimes. The managers also consider that organizing, abetting, or participating
in terrorist acts or activities would include not only pulling a trigger or planting a
bomb but providing support and assistance, such as but not limited to: planning, pro-
74. H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 100-475, at 162 (1987), reprinted in 1987 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2423, 2424 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (1994)).




viding facilities, recruiting, financing or fundraising, surveillance, courier service,
transportation, providing weapons, or forging or unlawfully procuring documents.
The term "terrorist activity" ... is intended to include international, targeted acts of
terrorism such as assassinations . . An alien would be considered to have partici-
pated in an act of terrorism whether he or she did so individually or as a member of
an organization.77
Second, and probably more importantly,
the prohibitions on exclusion and deportation, in particular those based on constitu-
tionally protected associations, would not apply to certain aliens. These included
those aliens who had assisted in Nazi persecutions; aliens seeking refugee status,
asylum, withholding of deportation or legalization who had engaged in persecution;
or any alien who was a member, officer, official, representative, or spokesman of the
PLO.78
These exceptions (which appeared in section 901(b) of the FRAA) thus
excluded members of the PLO from the Act's benefits simply because of
their membership. It was also possible that they would be denied the Act's
benefits because, merely by belonging to the PFLP or raising funds for it,
they might, under the Act's broad definition of "terrorist activity," be
deemed "terrorists."
As the American-Arab case progressed through the courts, this difficulty
did not disappear. Instead, it was accentuated in 1990 and again in 1996.
In 1990, Congress enacted sweeping amendments to the INA. The
amendments included "a comprehensive revision of all existing grounds for
exclusion and deportation, including.., the substantial revision of security
and foreign policy grounds . . . .,,79 Among other things, the Immigration
Amendments of 1990 (IMMACT)80 repealed the 1952 Act's ideological
grounds for exclusion8 l and deportation. 2 Congress replaced them with
new provisions that closely mirrored the language of the FRAA. As
amended by the IMMACT, the INA established a general category of ex-
clusion based on "Security and Related Grounds." This category included
a "General" subcategory that excluded aliens seeking to enter the United
States to "engage solely, principally, or incidentally" in:
(i) any activity (1) to violate any law of the United States relating to espionage or
sabotage or (II) to violate or evade any law prohibiting the export from the United
States of goods, technology, or sensitive information,
77. Id. at 164.
78. See id. at 164-65 (discussing certain aliens to whom exclusions would not apply).
79. H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 101-955, at 128 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
6784, 6793.
80. Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978-5088.
81. See INA § 237(a)(6), 8 U.S.C. § 182(a)(6) (repealed 1990).
82. See id§ 241(a)(6), 8 U.S.C. § 125l(a)(6) (repealed 1990).
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(ii) any other unlawful activity, or
(iii) any activity a purpose of which is the opposition to, or the control or overthrow
of, the government of the United States by force, violence, or other unlawful means.
8 3
The INA further included a "terrorist activities" subcategory that ex-
cluded "any alien who (I) has engaged in a terrorist activity, or (II) a con-
sular officer or the Attorney General knows, or has reason to believe, is
likely to engage after entry in any terrorist activity.
84
The INA also provided for the possible exclusion of PLO (or PFLP)
members in a manner similar, but not identical, to the way that the FRAA
had denied them protection. First, the INA stated: "An alien who is an of-
ficer, official, representative, or spokesman of the [PLO] is considered, for
purposes of this chapter, to be engaged in a terrorist activity. ' s5 Present in
the FRAA, but missing here, is any presumption arising out of simple
"membership" in the PLO.
Second, the INA defined "engage in terrorist activity" broadly:
As used in this Act, the term "engage in terrorist activity" means to commit, in an in-
dividual capacity or as a member of an organization, an act of terrorist activity, or an
act which the actor knows, or reasonably should know, affords material support to
any individual, organization, or government in conducting a terrorist activity at any
time. 6
Under this broad definition, anyone who "solicits[s] funds or other
things of value for terrorist activity or for any terrorist organization" or
"solicit[s] any individual for membership in a terrorist organization" is de-
fined as "engag[ing] in terrorist activity. ''s7 Again, the reach of the defini-
tion is broad enough to reach many individuals who have neither approved,
condoned, nor even known about particular violent acts or plans.
Third, the drafters of the IMMACT provided no textual definition of
"terrorist organization," but the conference report made it clear that the
term is broad enough to include organizations whose members or leader-
ship engaged in terrorist activities years ago. The drafters also gave their
approval to using "information from the intelligence community" deter-
mining the status of an organization, but made no provision for sharing that
information with aliens implicated by it.88
83. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(A) (1994).
84. Id. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(i).
85. Id. § 1182(a)(3)(B).
86. Id. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iii). As amended, the INA defines "terrorist activity" to in-
clude a variety of violent acts, ranging from hijacking and sabotage, to kidnapping, assassi-
nation, and biological warfare. See id. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(ii) (defining "terrorist activity").
87. Id. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iii)(IV), (V).




The IMMACT also added section 237(a)(4) to the INA, which estab-
lished new "Security and Related Grounds" for deportation. In most re-
spects, these grounds mirrored the parallel grounds for exclusion, which the
statute incorporated by reference.8 9
Thus, "after the repeal of the 1952 Act, the INS instituted new proceed-
ings against permanent resident aliens Hamide and Shehadeh under the
'terrorist activity' provision of the Immigration Act of 1990." 90 With the
new proceedings, the INS was apparently attempting to take advantage of
yet another recently-enacted, anti-terrorist, anti-Palestinian statute. For the
third time in three years, it had instituted charges under a different theory,
relying on a different statutory predicate. Clearly, the INS was "piling on."
When, in 1995, the Ninth Circuit addressed the case again in AAADC I,
pertinent information about the INS campaign against the LA 8 was re-
vealed:
The status of the charges under the 1952 Act [were] not clear: the government has as-
serted at different times that the prior charges and proceedings under that Act remain
pending concurrent with the new proceedings, or that the new charges 'amended' the
basis of the deportation proceedings so that the 'terrorist activity' charges are the only
ones currently pending.9'
For the purposes of this legislation, the conferees consider a "terrorist organization"
to be one whose leadership, or whose members, with the knowledge, approval or ac-
quiescence of the leadership, have taken part in terrorist activities. In making deter-
minations for the purpose of establishing excludability, the Department of State (or
the Immigration Service when appropriate) should take into account the best avail-
able information from the intelligence community. A group may be considered a ter-
rorist organization even if it has not conducted terrorist operations in the past several
years, but there is reason to believe it still has the capacity and inclination to conduct
such operations.
Id. There was, however, one significant, and perhaps unintended, exception. As amended
by the IMMACT, INA section 237(a)(4) deportation established no explicit presumption
that an "officer, official, representative, or spokesman of the [PLO] is considered. tor the
purposes of this Act, to be engaged in a terrorist activity."
89. See 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(4)(B) (1994) (defining "engaged in terrorist activities"
through cross-reference to 8 U.S.C. § I I 82(a)(3)(b)(iii)).
90. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. v. Reno (AAADC 1), 70 F.3d 1045
(9th Cir. 1995).
91. Id.; see also Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. (American-
Arab), 119 S. Ct. 936, 939 n.2 (1999) ("When the 1952 Act was repealed, a new 4terrorist
activity' provision was added by the Immigration Act of 1990. The INS charged Hamide
and Shehadeh under this, but it is unclear whether that was in addition to, or in substitution




A footnote in the Supreme Court's American-Arab decision informs us
that "[r]espondents Barakat and Sharif were subsequently granted legaliza-
tion and are no longer deportable based on the original status violations."
92
Nothing in the opinion explains how that happened or why it might be im-
portant in explaining the Ninth Circuit's turn-around.
The brief answer to both the "how" and the "why" is confidential infor-
mation. The struggle for legalization under INA section 245A in which
Barakat and Sharif successfully engaged has always been a side issue in
American-Arab, but it deserves more than a one-sentence footnote, if for no
other reason than it sheds considerable light on the role played by confi-
dential information in the litigation.
(I) Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
As the court in United States v. Hamide93 indicated:
On March 10, 1987, in the course of the original deportation proceedings, the eight
aliens filed a motion before the immigration judge under 18 U.S.C. [section] 3504
(1982), requesting that the government affirm or deny the existence of electronic sur-
veillance of any of the eight or their attorneys. The motion also requested a hearing
on the adequacy of any government denial, or, if the government acknowledged sur-
veillance, 'a hearing concerning the legality of that surveillance and the extent to
which evidence in the current proceedings was obtained as a result of that surveil-
lance.'94
The inquiry into the government's sources and uses of information thus
commenced before the LA 8 initiated their first amendment action. The
question reached the Ninth Circuit in 19909' and the District of Columbia
Circuit in 1991.96 Initially formulated as an inquiry about, and a challenge
to, the government's use of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of
1978 (FISA),97 its overt fruits were meager.
Plaintiffs questioned the basis for governmental action, as provided by
the FISA:
If an appropriate challenge to surveillance conducted under the authority of the act is
filed, Federal district courts 'shall' conduct ex parte, in camera reviews to determine
92. American-Arab, 119 S. Ct. at 939 n. I.
93. 914 F.2d 1147 (9th Cir. 1990).
94. Id. at 1148-49.
95. See id. at 1147 (noting question of inquiry into government's sources).
96. See ACLU v. Barr, 952 F.2d 457 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (noting question of inquiry into
government's sources).
97. Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783 (1978) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1801 (1994 &
Supp. 11995)).
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whether FISA surveillance, undertaken pursuant to an order of the FISA Court, was
'lawfully authorized and conducted' whenever the issue arises in a proceeding and
the Attorney General, in an affidavit, represents that disclosure or an adversary hear-
ing would harm the national security interests of the United States.98
Judge Real, sitting in the United States District Court for the Central Dis-
trict of California, concluded that the government had not abused the
authority granted it by FISA and refused to grant relief.99 The Ninth Cir-
cuit challenge foundered when the Court found that Judge Real's determi-
nation was not a "final order," and hence, not yet reviewable in the Court
of Appeals.'00 The Court held out the possibility that review would be-
come available if and when a final order of deportation was issued.' 0'
As the Barr court noted:
On August 9, 1989, before the Ninth Circuit had ruled, plaintiffs brought this lawsuit.
The Complaint, as amended, alleged that the eight alien plaintiffs had been and were
continuing to be subject to illegal surveillance, that their communications with the
thirteen plaintiff attorneys had been intercepted and that they were continuing to
communicate with their attorneys.
0 2
The District Court dismissed the case on the ground that complainants had
failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.
0 3
98. Barr, 952 F.2d at 462. According to the Barr court:
FISA sets forth three circumstances in which the issue could arise: (1) in an adminis-
trative, criminal or civil proceeding when a governmental body gives notice of its
plan to use the fruits of FISA surveillance against a person who has been subjected to
the surveillance; (2) when such a person moves to suppress the evidence obtained or
derived from FISA surveillance; and (3) when such a person otherwise moves to dis-
cover or obtain information derived from FISA surveillance.
Id.
99. According to the Barr court:
Chief Judge Real, after conducting an ex parte, in camera review in compliance with
[section] 1806(0, issued an order on February 28, 1989, deciding "that the electronic
surveillance[s] disclosed to this court in camera were legally obtained pursuant to
proper order of a court of competent jurisdiction" and that "it is not necessary to the
determination of the legality of the electronic surveillances submitted to the court to
disclose those applications, orders and materials or any portion thereof to respon-
dents."
Id. at 463.
100. See United States v. Hamide, 914 F.2d 1147, 1150 (9th Cir. 1990) (noting that 28
U.S.C. section 1291 "confers jurisdiction on courts of appeals from final decisions of district
courts, and 'embodies a strong congressional policy against piecemeal reviews, and against
obstructing or impeding an ongoing judicial proceeding by interlocutory appeals').
101. See id. at 1150-51 (holding out possibility for review upon final decision of depor-
tation).
102. Barr, 952 F.2d at 463.
103. See id. (noting district court dismissal).
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The Barr court accepted most of the District Court's reasoning. With
respect to "past surveillance," it followed the District Court in deciding that
"Chief Judge Real's order had conclusively determined the legality of any
past surveillance disclosed in the Lindemann declaration," and "that review
here would amount to an impermissible collateral attack on that deci-
sion. '0 4 The court also found that certain plaintiffs lacked standing to
challenge FISA or its implementation. It dismissed certain additional
challenges brought by the Other Six on the ground that they were not
"United States Persons," who are accorded special protection by FISA.
0 5
Nevertheless, in a very narrow ruling, the Barr court held that the district
court had improperly dismissed the claim that ongoing surveillance vio-
lated the petitioner aliens' rights.10 6 Rather than holding out any meaning-
ful hope to them, however, the Barr court suggested that permitting the pe-
titioners to file a claim would not necessarily entitle them to discover any
of the confidential information at the government's disposal. Instead, the
court intimated that after the case was filed, and before any evidence was
produced, it would look with favor on a summary judgment motion made
by the government.'0 7
Despite the failure to achieve favorable rulings, the FISA litigation
forced the government to publicly take early positions, and thus, shed im-
portant light on its subsequent conduct. For example, two weeks after the
surveillance issue was raised, "the government responded that none of the
evidence in the deportation proceedings had been gathered by electronic
surveillance, without stating whether any such surveillance had oc-
curred."108 Undeterred, "[tihe eight filed motions after deportation pro-
ceedings were reinstituted in June 1987 and again in December 1988 re-
questing affirmance or denial of the surveillance."' 1 9 After the immigration
104. Id.
105. See id. at 464.
Among the eight alien plaintiffs, only Khader Hamide and Michel Shehadeh, who are
permanent resident aliens, fit within the definition of "United States persons" to
which [section] 1805(a)(3)(A) might apply. There are six other alien plaintiffs. Four
of them (Amer, Mungai, Amjad Obeid and Ayman Obeid) were parties in the [sec-
tion] 1806(f) proceeding; two (Sharif and Barakat) were not. All six are non-resident
aliens who entered the United States on the basis of student or visitors visas between
1975 and 1983, None of them therefore qualify as a "United States person" - that
is, in the case of an individual, a United States citizen or an alien lawfully admitted
for permanent residence.
Id.
106. See id. at 467 (disagreeing with district court's dismissal of claim).
107. See id. at 469-70 (intimating summary judgment ruling in favor of government be-
cause of conflict with system ofjudicial authorization Congress intended FISA to have).




court granted the motion, Michael P. Lindemann, the government's chief
attorney in the case, filed a declaration with the immigration court:
Lindemann's declaration disclosed that five of the six appellants had been overheard
on electronic surveillance. Lindemann also stated that there had been some video
surveillance, and that the Federal Bureau of Investigation had placed a pen register on
the telephone of one of the appellants. He asserted that the government would not
use any of the surveillance in the immigration proceedings .... 110
The accuracy of Lindemann's assertion would become an important,
though never fully articulated, issue in the long struggle of Barakat and
Sharif to achieve legalization.
(II) Legalization
Aiad Barakat and Naim Sharif first applied for legalization in June,
1987. As described by the district court:
[I]egalization under IRCA is a two-step process. First, the Attorney General grants
temporary resident status to any alien who establishes: (1) that he has maintained a
continuous, unlawful residence in the United States from a date prior to January 1,
1982; (2) that he is admissible as an immigrant; and (3) that he has not been con-
victed of a felony or more than two misdemeanors committed in the United States.
Second, the Attorney General grants permanent resident status to any alien granted
temporary resident status who resides here continuously for eighteen months and
meets certain literacy requirements.
I I I
Barakat and Sharif met all of the statutory requirements for legalization.
Both had been in the United States in "continuous, unlawful residence"
since December 31, 1981.112 Neither had been convicted of a felony or
more than two misdemeanors. Both were literate in English and unlikely to
depart the United States even temporarily, since both were fighting depor-
tation. The only issue was whether each was admissible as an immigrant.
For purposes of INA section 245A, to be "admissible" was equivalent to
110. Id. (emphasis added). Lindemann also asserted:
"[Wihile attorneys of record in this case have been overheard, only a single conver-
sation was in connection with this case, and that single conversation did not involve
attorney-client communication and was not otherwise privileged." The declaration
also stated that the government intended to seek a determination of the legality of the
surveillance from the district court.
Id.
11. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. v. Reno, 883 F. Supp. 1365, 1368
(C.D. Cal. 1995) (citations omitted).
112. In fact, the government did not contest the fulfillment of the required residency pe-
riod. As the court noted, "[t]he INS concedes that Barakat and Sharif have a substantial in-
terest at stake because they seek the right to remain legally in this country .... Both have




not being "excludable" under the provisions of INA section 212(a), as it
then existed.' 3
Barakat and Sharif waited nearly four years for a determination of their
admissibility.'" 4 When they had applied for "legalization" in June 1987,
"INS regulations required all issues of statutory eligibility for immigration
benefits, including legalization, to be determined solely on the basis of in-
formation in the record disclosed to the applicant."'"1 5
On January 7, 1991, the INS amended the rules regarding confidential information.
While the prior rule had allowed the INS to rely on undisclosed, classified informa-
tion only for discretionary determinations such as exclusion and withholding of de-
portation, the new regulations additionally allow reliance on such information for
nondiscretionary immigration benefits such as legalization.' 16
In March 1991, after a delay of nearly four years, the INS finally adjudi-
cated their legalization claim, 7 denying it on the basis of undisclosed clas-
sified information" 8 that the INS asserted, demonstrated that they were ex-
cludable under INA section 212(a)(28)(F)."19
Barakat and Sharif filed suit in United States district court, challenging
the use by the INS of classified and undisclosed information as the basis for
its decision to deny legalization. They made five claims: (1) the regulation
allowing for reliance on undisclosed classified information should not be
applied retroactively because it would cause them manifest injustice; (2)
the use of undisclosed classified evidence denies them due process; (3) the
use of such evidence violates the First Amendment, which requires height-
ened procedural safeguards where government officials review speech and
associational activities; (4) the INS waived its right to invoke the regulation
when it represented to the Ninth Circuit that it would not enforce a similar
113. See INA § 245A(d)(2)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(d)(2)(A) (1994) (indicating certain
grounds for exclusion, including overstays, failure to obtain required labor certification,
documentary violations at time of last entry, and illiteracy, were not applicable at all); id §
245A(d)(2)(B)(i) (indicating other grounds were waivable in discretion of Attorney Gen-
eral); id. § 245A(d)(2)(B)(ii) (delineating enumerated grounds, including 1952 Act ideologi-
cal grounds codified in INA section 212(a)(28) which were not waivable).
114. See Reno, 883 F. Supp. at 1368 ("Although plaintiffs filed their applications in
1987, the [INS] did not adjudicate those applications until March 1991.").
115. Id. at 1368.
116. Id. at 1369 (citations omitted).
117. See id. at 1368. Recent case law suggests that delays of more than 20 months in
"adjustment of status" cases may be deemed unreasonable and give rise to the award of at-
torneys' fees. See Nadine K. Wettstein, Wasted Days and Wasted Nights: INS Visa Proc-
essing Delays and How to Combat Them, 76 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1441, 1446-47 (1999)
(discussing cases in which attorneys' fees were awarded).
118. See Reno, 883 F. Supp. at 1369 (noting INS denied legalization on basis of classi-
fied information).
119. See id. at 1369 n.l (discussing INA section 212(a)(28)(F)).
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provision against Barakat and Sharif; and (5) INA section 212(A)(28) vio-
lates the First Amendment on its face because it penalizes constitutionally
protected associations.1
20
Although this suit was apparently filed in the Spring of 1991, a decision
by the District Court was not forthcoming until January 24, 1995 - seven
and one-half years after Barakat and Sharif had first sought "legaliza-
tion.,, 121 None of the delay, it is important to note, was attributable in any
way to their conduct. Since the INS had withdrawn the original ideological
charges against them and substituted routine status violations as the
grounds for their deportation, they were statutorily entitled to apply for the
benefit of legislation.
When the District Court finally did hear Barakat's and Sharif's case, it
first disposed of claims made by the government that the case was not
"ripe" for adjudication and that neither had yet exhausted their administra-
tive remedies. 122 The court also described part of the process that Barakat
and Sharif confronted:
The Notices [to deny "legalization"] conclude by stating that unless the plaintiffs can
disprove the INS's charges (the evidence of which remains confidential), the INS will
deny their applications. If the applications are denied, Barakat and Sharif will be in-
eligible for temporary resident status--the first step in the legalization process. In ad-
dition, they will lose their right to work in this country.... The next step in the appli-
cation process will be for the INS to hold a hearing giving Barakat and Sharif an
opportunity to rebut the Government's allegations of PFLP membership. The Gov-
ernment contends that it does not need to reveal the classified information to the
plaintiffs at that hearing.'
23
Although the statute is ambiguous, it appears that three other steps also
were available and could have been required before a final resolution of the
issue in ordinary INS proceedings: a deportation hearing before an immi-
gration judge (in which Barakat and Sharif would not have been able to
present either constitutional or selective enforcement arguments), an appeal
of any denial by the immigration judge to the Board of Immigration Ap-
peals (where again no constitutional or selective enforcement arguments
would be entertained), and finally, an appeal of the BIA's decision to the
Ninth Circuit. 124
120. See id. at 1369-70 (outlining appellants' claims).
121. See id. at 1365 (listing date of decision).
122. See id. at 1370 (discussing justiciability of claims).
123. Id. at 1369.
124. See INA § 245A(f)(3)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(f)(3)(A) (1994) (providing for "single
level of administrative appellate review" under a newly-established "appellate authority" to
be created by the Attorney General). But see id. § 245A(f)(4)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(f)(4)(A)
(1994 & Supp. IV 1998) (providing that "there shall be judicial review of [an administrative
review] denial only in the judicial review of an order of deportation under section [106]").
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Having rejected the government's argument for more delay and finding
the case "justiciable," the District Court then focused most of its attention
on the due process implications of deporting a resident alien without af-
fording him the opportunity to see or challenge the evidence used against
him. The District Court first concluded that Barakat and Sharif, as aliens
physically present in the United States, were entitled to Fifth Amendment
due process.125 The court then employed the Mathews v. Eldridge126 bal-
ancing test'27 determining whether the government's intended use of confi-
dential, undisclosed evidence in a legalization case passed constitutional
muster. Finding that the interest of Barakat and Sharif in avoiding depor-
tation was great and that the interest of the government in withholding all
evidence from them was not nearly as compelling, the court found in the
aliens' favor.'
Furthermore, the court took particular notice of the virtually impossible
burden that the government would have imposed on Barakat and Sharif:
The INS's reliance on undisclosed, classified information in this case imposes on
plaintiffs the nearly impossible burden of proving two negatives - that they are not
members of the PFLP, and that the PFLP does not advocate any of the statutorily-
disapproved doctrines. In Rafeedie II, the D.C. Circuit likened such a position to the
dilemma faced by Joseph K. in Franz Kafka's The Trial, and concluded that "[it is
difficult to imagine how even someone innocent of all wrongdoing could meet such a
burden."'
129
The court's decision also attempted to take available "facts" into account
when attempting to distinguish between the government's asserted general
interest in protecting "national security" and its apparent particular interest
in excluding Barakat and Sharif:
While the Government made a strong showing that Barakat and Sharif are affiliated
with the PFLP, it has not shown that Barakat and Sharif personally have advocated
INA section 106 has since been repealed. Section 242(b) of the INA now governs judicial
review of deportation hearings.
125. See Reno, 883 F. Supp. at 1372-73 (concluding resident aliens are entitled to due
process protections that other aliens are not entitled to).
126. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
127. See id. at 335 (delineating test in which court must weigh).
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of
an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the prob-
able value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the
Government's interest, including function involved and the fiscal and administrative
burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.
Id.
128. See Reno, 883 F. Supp. at 1373-78 (concluding that plaintiffs have substantial in-
terest at stake and INS's use of undisclosed, classified information would violate due proc-
ess rights).
129. Id. at 1376 (quoting Rafeedie v. INS, 880 F.2d 506, 516 (D.C. Cir. 1989)).
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any of the doctrines of 8 U.S.C. [section] 1182(a)(28)(F). These particular plaintiffs
have never been charged with any crime, and there is no indication that they are vio-
lent terrorists. If the INS had made a stronger showing that allowing these particular
plaintiffs to stay in the country would create a serious threat to national security, the
balance might very well have tipped in the government's favor.130
The court buttressed this conclusion, referring to one of the few "unclassi-
fied" facts in the record. The court noted, "[i]n fact, former FBI Director
William Webster admitted that plaintiffs 'had not been found to have en-
gaged themselves in illegal activity . . .[and that] if these individuals had
been United States citizens, there would not have been a basis for their ar-
rest.'
1 31
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the District Court's decision in
part.132 It upheld the District Court's findings regarding the balancing test
discussed above. 3 3 Yet with respect to the use of classified, undisclosed
information, it devoted most of its opinion to questions of justiciability.13 4
As did the District Court, the Ninth Circuit relied on the D.C. Circuit's
opinion in Rafeedie v. INS, 135 concluding that no good purpose would be
served by delaying a decision.
36
The Ninth Circuit's affirmation of the District Court's holding on the use
of confidential, undisclosed information had no direct bearing on the prin-
cipal claim made by the LA 8, namely, that their associations with the
PFLP were protected by the First Amendment. But it demonstrated a
strong willingness to look beyond claims of governmental "plenary author-
ity" to matters of individual constitutional entitlement and a respect for the
importance of facts (including government-created delay and the emptiness
of additional administrative proceedings) in deciding whether to adjudicate
the claims of aliens facing deportation.
3. The Emerging Evidence
The final factor pushing the Ninth Circuit to change its mind and decide
the case "on the merits" undoubtedly was the volume of evidence that the
130. Id. at 1378.
131. Id at 1378 n.14.
132. See American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. v. Reno (AAADC I), 70 F.3d
1045, 1071 (9th Cir. 1995) (affirming in part, and reversing and remanding in part District
Court's decision).
133. See id. at 1061-62 (recognizing test applied by District Court).
134. See generally id. at 1054-70.
135. 880 F.2d 506 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
136. See AAADC I, 70 F.3d at 1061-62 (quoting Rafeedie v. INS, 880 F.2d 506, 516
(D.C. Cir. 1989)) ("No facts relevant to the due process determination can be adduced at the
agency hearing because that hearing proceeds under the premise that use of undisclosed in-
formation against the alien is legal.").
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LA 8 managed to assemble in the course of the litigation. As previously
stated, a major factor in the Ninth Circuit's 1991 decision to vacate the
District Court's 1989 judgment in favor of the Other Six was its determi-
nation that the case was not yet ripe, lacking a fully-developed factual rec-
ord. 37 Subsequent developments, including the government's commitment
to using confidential, undisclosed information, helped demonstrate the
practical difficulties of ever generating such a record.
Nevertheless, by the time that the LA 8 managed to reach the Ninth Cir-
cuit again in 1995, they had managed to secure substantial discovery. The
Ninth Circuit described that discovery in the context of the selective en-
forcement claims made by the Other Six:
The district court ordered discovery and reviewed evidence from the aliens and from
the Government that would not be available in a deportation proceeding. The aliens
have submitted to the district court more than 450 pages of declarations, exhibits, and
transcripts in support of their claims. In the course of factual development, for exam-
ple, the INS has conceded that Amer is the only alien that the Los Angeles INS office
has sought to deport for taking too few credits as a student, even though many such
students have been reported to the INS. We therefore find that the district court had
jurisdiction to consider these selective enforcement claims.'38
B. The Ninth Circuit Confronts the First Amendment
In 1989, Judge Wilson held that the Other Six were entitled to First
Amendment protection in deportation proceedings and had been unconsti-
tutionally denied that protection when the government sought to deport
them for expressive conduct that was protected under the test enunciated by
the Supreme Court in Brandenburg v. Ohio.13 1
In his opinion, Judge Wilson asserted that, "[s]ince aliens enjoy full First
Amendment protection outside the deportation setting, we decline to adopt
a lesser First Amendment test for use within that setting.' 40 He continued:
We do not dispute the Government's interests in preserving national security and
promoting foreign policy in the exercise of its immigration power. These interests
are adequately protected, however, by the prevailing First Amendment standard al-
lowing for the deportation of individuals who advocate imminent lawless action and
whose speech is likely to induce such action.1
4 1
137. See American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. v. Thornburgh, 970 F.2d 501,
510-11 (9th Cir. 1991) (discussing ripeness issue), aff'g in part, rev'g in part, Arab-
American Anti-Discrimination Comm. v. Meese, 714 F. Supp. 1060 (C.D. Cal. 1989).
138. AAADCI, 70 F.3d at 1055-56.
139. 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
140. Meese, 714 F. Supp. at 1082.
141. Id. at 1082 n.18 (citing Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969)).
2000]
ADMINISTRATIVE LA W RE VIEW
Judge Wilson conceded that "[t]he government could also deport aliens,
without violating the First Amendment, for their affiliation with an organi-
zation, if it established that that group affiliation posed a legitimate threat
to the government."'' 42 Nevertheless, he argued that "there is no basis for a
lower standard of First Amendment protection for aliens"' 43 because:
[Als long as the Government narrowly tailors its deportation laws to further its com-
pelling interests in foreign policy and national security, it can enact laws, (e.g., espio-
nage or national secrecy laws), that allow for the deportation of aliens on the basis of
their First Amendment activities. '
Six years later, when the Ninth Circuit finally found the matter ripe
enough to go forward, it reached a remarkably similar conclusion - al-
though the strange procedural evolution of the case meant that the latter
opinion was expressed in "selective enforcement," rather than "facial" or
"as applied" terms. 145
1. The Basic Argument
a. Political Expression and Association are Core Values Protected by the
First Amendment
The Ninth Circuit accepts as fundamental that political expression and
association are core values protected by the First Amendment. The Court
commences its First Amendment argument with the observation that:
The Government does not dispute that the First Amendment protects a citizen's right
to associate with a political organization; even if that association includes ties with
groups that advocate illegal conduct or engage in illegal acts, the power of the Gov-
ernment to penalize association is narrowly circumscribed. "[T]he right of associa-
tion is a 'basic constitutional freedom' . . . [that] lies at the foundation of a free soci-
ety."14 6
142. Id. (citing Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169. 186 (1972); United States v. Robel, 389
U.S. 258, 265-66 (1967)).
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. See American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. v. Reno (AAADC 1), 70 F.3d
1045, 1061 (9th Cir. 1995) (couching opinion allowing for deportation of aliens in terms of
"selective enforcement").
146. Id. at 1063 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 25 (1976)).
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b. Protection Extends to Resident Aliens as Well as to Citizens
Resident aliens are "persons" entitled to the benefits of the First
Amendment. Physical presence in the United States conveys certain rights.
As the court in AAADC I noted:
The Supreme Court has consistently distinguished between aliens in the United States
and those seeking to enter from outside the country, and has accorded to aliens living
in the United States those protections of the Bill of Rights that are not, by the text of
the Constitution, restricted to citizens. Accordingly, the Court has explicitly stated
that "[fireedom of speech and of press is accorded aliens residing in this country."'' 47
This extension of First Amendment rights to aliens is based on a broad
notion of community, which includes not only citizens but also resident ali-
ens.1 48 Thus, as James Madison noted in his Report on the Virginia Reso-
lutions, "[a]s [aliens] owe, on one hand, a temporary obedience, they are
entitled, in return, to their protection and advantage."'
149
Therefore, "although Congress and the President may regulate aliens'
admission and residence in the country, that regulation must be 'consistent
with the Constitution."" ' 0  As Justice Murphy noted in his concurring
opinion in Bridges v. Wixon,'5' "[s]ince resident aliens have constitutional
rights, it follows that Congress may not ignore them in the exercise of its
'plenary' power of deportation."5 2
c. Protection Is Not Restricted to Popular or "Mainstream" Political
Groups
The First Amendment is violated by depriving racists, communists and
flag-burners of the opportunity to express themselves peacefully, and to as-
sociate and organize in pursuit of their political aims. The United States
government cannot "deny[ ] rights and privileges solely because of a citi-
zen's association with an unpopular organization. ' 5 3 This is particularly
true because our nation's history reveals an unfortunate tendency to de-
monize foreigners:
147. Id. at 1063-64 (quoting Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 148 (1945)) (citation
omitted).
148. See id. at 1064-65 (noting distinction between exclusion and deportation rests on
territorial concept of diverse national community).
149. Id. at 1065 (quoting JAMES MADISON, REPORT ON THE VIRGiNIA RESOLUTIONS
(1799), reprinted in 4 DEBATES ON THE FEDERAL CONSTITuTION 546, 556 (Jonathan Elliot
ed., 1987)).
150. Id. (quoting Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 712 (1893)).
151. 326 U.S. 135 (1945).
152. AAADC 1, 70 F.3d at 1065 (quoting Bridges, 326 U.S. at 161 (Murphy, J., concur-
ring)).
153. Id. at 1063 (quoting Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 186 (1972)).
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Aliens, who often have different cultures and languages, have been subjected to intol-
erant and harassing conduct in our past, particularly in times of crises. 5 4 It is thus
especially appropriate that the First Amendment principle of tolerance for different
voices restrain our decisions to expel a participant in that community from our
midst.155
The court's argument stands as a powerful counsel for special vigilance
when those targeted are members of the group that is subject to the most
pervasive stereotyping in the last several decades: Palestinians, particularly
if they are identified, as are the LA 8, with policies or organizations op-
posed to the State of Israel or the Israeli Peace Process.
d To Lose Protection, the Threat Posed by the Alien Must Be Substantial
and Immediate
The Ninth Circuit argued that "the values underlying the First Amend-
ment require the full applicability of First Amendment rights to the depor-
tation setting. ' 56 According to the court, "read properly, Harisiades [v.
Shaughnessy] establishes that deportation grounds are to be judged by the
same standard applied to other burdens on First Amendment rights.""'
Judge Wilson analyzed Harisiades v. Shaughnessy58 extensively in his
1989 District Court opinion. According to Judge Wilson:
Decided in 1952, Harisiades v. Shaughnessy.. . involved an attack on the provision
in the Alien Registration Act of 1940 that authorized deportation of aliens based on
their past Communist Party memberships. The aliens assailed this provision on three
grounds: the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause, the First Amendment freedom of
speech and assembly, and the prohibition of passing an ex post facto law under Arti-
cle I, [section] 9, clause 3 of the Constitution. 5 9
Only their First Amendment argument received serious attention from the
court:
In addressing the aliens' First Amendment argument, the Harisiades Court dealt di-
rectly with the question of whether aliens have First Amendment rights in deportation
154. Id at 1064. See generally Alien Enemies Act of 1798, ch. 58, 1 Stat. 570, 571
(authorizing President to expel "all such aliens as he shall judge dangerous to the peace and
safety of the United States"); JOHN HiGHAM, STRANGERS IN THE LAND: PATTERNS OF
AMERICAN NATIVISM 1860-1925 229-31 (2d ed. 1963) (describing the Palmer Raids of
1919-20).
155. AAADC I, 70 F.3d at 1064.
156. Id.
157. Id. (quoting T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Federal Regulation of Aliens and the Con-
stitution, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 862, 869 (1989)).
158. 342 U.S. 580 (1952).




matters. The Government, as in this case, urged the Court to find that the First
Amendment does not apply "to the political decision of Congress to expel a class of
aliens whom it deems undesirable residents." The Court rejected this argument, rul-
ing that it had the duty of distinguishing between aliens' constitutionally protected
"advocacy of political methods" and their unprotected "methodical but prudent in-
citement to violence." To make this distinction, the Court explicitly employed the
then prevailing First Amendment test from Dennis v. United States.'6°
The significance of this decision lay not in the result, but in the court's
method of reaching that result. The court reasoned that, "[a]lthough the
[Harisiades] Court found that the First Amendment did not prevent the
resident aliens' deportation, the importance of its ruling for the instant case
is that the Court applied the same First Amendment standard to aliens'
claims that then applied to United States citizens' First Amendment chal-
lenges.'
61
According to the Ninth Circuit, applying the same method to aliens fac-
ing deportation today will yield a different result, because the constitutional
standard has changed:
Under the standard enunciated by the Supreme Court in Brandenburg v. Ohio, advo-
cacy may be punished only if it is "directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless
action and is likely to incite or produce such action." The government must establish
a "knowing affiliation" and a "specific intent to further those illegal aims." "Guilt by
association alone" violates the First Amendment.1
62
The government was required to shoulder a burden, demonstrating that the
LA 8 are not merely "associated" with the PFLP but also are meaningfully
implicated in its violent activities. The court clearly believed that the gov-
ernment had not met this burden.
2. Hinting at a Variation on the Theme: "Selective Enforcement"
The Ninth Circuit employed the language of "selective enforcement" for
two very different reasons. First, for Hamide and Shehadeh, the two per-
manent resident members of the LA 8, it was the only theory that would
overcome earlier determinations, which were not particularly well-founded,
that they would be unable to mount a "facial" or "as applied" legal chal-
lenge until they had exhausted their administrative remedies. 63 Second,
for the Other Six, and particularly for the "Other Four" after Barakat and
Sharif achieved "legalization," the theory provided the only certain means
of securing their protection after a transparent attempt by the government to
160. Id. (citations omitted).
161. Id.
162. AAADC I, 70 F.3d at 1063 (citations omitted).
163. See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
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substitute a "status violation" rationale for deportation for the real reason
admitted by INS and Justice Department officials, namely, the desire to de-
port them for their alleged PFLP membership and activities.
'64
I will return briefly to "selective enforcement" in Part II when I consider
how the Supreme Court dealt with the issue. Here, I simply note that in
making their "selective enforcement" argument, the LA 8 presented evi-
dence to demonstrate that Palestinians had been specially singled out for
deportation and exclusion on the basis of 1952 Act prohibited associations
or so-called "terrorist activities." This evidence was intended to demon-
strate not only the government's motives (which were, after all, quite trans-
parent), but also the government's "disparate treatment" of different
groups. 165 We will reconsider the significance of these dual objectives, the
evidence necessary to demonstrate them, and their relationship to the First
Amendment when we turn again to "selective enforcement" in Part II.
II. PLAYING GAMES WITH THE FACTS AND THE LAW: THE SUPREME
COURT'S DECISION
A. Getting from AAADC I to the Supreme Court
1. The Remand to District Court, the Release of Previously Confidential
Information, and the Issue of Fundraising
When the case emerged from the Ninth Circuit in 1995 all of the respon-
dents, after a long and complicated legal struggle, had secured a decision
(AAADC 1) that such "targeting" on account of an alien's affiliation, mem-
bership or advocacy of the general goals of the PFLP or the more general
doctrines of "world communism" violated the First Amendment. 66 The
decision upheld the preliminary injunction enjoining continuing efforts to
deport the Other Six, and remanded the case against Shehadeh and Hamide
to the District Court with instructions that it hear Shehadeh's and Hamide's
selective enforcement claim. 67
At this point the government, after attempting for nearly a decade to de-
port the LA 8 on the basis of undisclosed confidential information, sud-
164. See discussion supra Part I.A.I.
165. See AAADC , 70 F.3d at 1054 (suggesting that "[t]o succeed on a selective prose-
cution claim, the defendant bears the burden of showing both 'that others similarly situated
have not been prosecuted and that the prosecution is based on an impermissible motive')
(citations omitted).
166. See generally id. at 1066.
167. See id. at 1052 (upholding preliminary injunction and remanding for consideration
of selective enforcement claim).
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denly shifted gears. It delivered to the court a "new 10,000-page submis-
sion" intended to demonstrate that Shehadeh and Hamide were, in fact "ter-
rorists" or persons who had engaged in "terrorist activities." The govern-
ment asserted, among other things, that they had engaged in fundraising for
the PFLP. But the District Court refused to consider the government's
"new" evidence since it found that the submission was available to the
government at the time the preliminary injunction was entered, and that the
government simply chose not to litigate the facts at that time.,68 The Dis-
trict Court then entered a permanent injunction staying the proceedings
against Hamide and Shehadeh.
169
Subsequently, the government took two actions. First, it filed an appeal
with the Ninth Circuit contesting the District Court's new determination
with respect to Hamide and Shehadeh, and the court's pre-AAADC I pre-
liminary injunction in favor of the Other Six. v° Second, while the appeal
was pending, the government filed motions to dismiss the case both with
the District Court and the Ninth Circuit panel.'
2. AAADC II: The Ninth Circuit Refuses to Dissolve the Injunction
Protecting the Other Six
The Ninth Circuit summarily affirmed the district court's decision re-
fusing to dissolve the existing preliminary injunction for two reasons.
First, the court noted that "the government had not demonstrated changed
circumstances."' 172 Second, the court found an impropriety in using a mo-
tion to dissolve an existing preliminary injunction in an attempt "to reliti-
gate on a fuller record preliminary injunction issues already decided."' 7 3
The Ninth Circuit adopted the District Court's reasoning in explaining
why it believed the government's new submissions in the case did not sup-
port a claim of "changed circumstances:"
168. See American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. v. Reno (AAADC II), 119 F.3d
1367. 1370 (9th Cir. 1997) (discussing proceedings and decision in district court after re-
mand from AAADC 1).
169. See id.
170. See id. at 1370-71 (noting government appeal arguing that deportation proceedings
were initiated for permissible reasons).
171. See id. at 1371 (noting government contention that federal courts lack subject mat-
ter jurisdiction except on review of final deportation orders).
172. Id. at 1375 (citing Favia v. Indiana Univ. of Pa., 7 F.3d 332, 337 (3d Cir. 1993))
(noting that modification of preliminary injunction requires changed circumstances that
would render continuance of injunction in original form inequitable).
173. Id. at 1375 (quoting American Optical Co. v. Rayex Corp., 394 F.2d 155, 155 (2d
Cir. 1968)).
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Up until [the] point [of that submission], the government had argued that the Plain-
tiffs did not possess the same First Amendment rights as citizens. Because the only
change in circumstances is of the government's own making, resulting from its deci-
sion to change its litigation strategy, we conclude that it is equitable to continue the
original injunction staying proceedings against the Six without consideration of the
new evidence.1
74
3. AAADC II: The Ninth Circuit Refuses to Overturn the New Injunction
Protecting Shehadeh and Hamide
The Ninth Circuit concluded that it and the District Court both retained
jurisdiction before it addressed the lower court's decision on Hamide and
Shehadeh. 175 The Ninth Circuit applied the standard they originally set
forth'7 6 to all of the controverted issues, and found that the District Court
had not abused its discretion. The court first addressed the issue of
whether, as the government contended, Plaintiffs "failed to produce suffi-
cient evidence showing that the INS refrained from deporting fundraisers in
other terrorist organizations."'' 77 The court found that "the comparison with
aliens who engaged in fundraising for other terrorist organizations is un-
necessary," since "the government does not dispute the district court's con-
clusion that the INS sought to deport the Plaintiffs because of mere mem-
bership in the PFLP" and "Plaintiffs did show that members of numerous
other organizations advocating violence and the destruction of property
were not deported."' 178 The court further found that "[e]ven if such a com-
parison were required, the Plaintiffs ha[d] produced sufficient evidence to
this effect.',
179
Next, the court turned to the issue of whether the lower court employed
the wrong legal standard in evaluating the "new evidence" of fundraising
activity. Since fundraising "activity, rather than mere association, is at is-
sue, the government maintain[ed] that the case should be analyzed under
the standard set forth in United States v. O'Brien."'80 The Ninth Circuit
174. AAADCII, 119F.3dat 1375.
175. See discussion infra Parts II.A.I.d & ll.A.l.e. Here, the Article examines the
AAADC M court's substantive reasons for its decision to affirm the injunction in favor of
Harnide and Shehadeh.
176. AAADC II, 119 F.3d at 1371 ("We review a decision regarding a preliminary in-
junction for an abuse of discretion. A district court abuses its discretion 'if the court bases
its decision on an erroneous legal conclusion or on clearly erroneous findings of fact."').
177. Id. at 1375.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 1376; see also United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (holding that




found that "O'Brien is inapplicable in a case such as this one, in which the
restrictions are in effect content-based."' 81 The appropriate consideration,
as the court determined, which the District Court adequately took into ac-
count, was the government's intent to stifle expression because of its ideo-
logical content.1 82 Secondly, the court concluded that "the government has
not challenged the factual finding made by the District Court that the INS
targeted the Plaintiffs for their mere association with the PFLP. Indeed, in
the prior appeal the government conceded that citizens would not have
been treated in the same fashion."'83
4. Congress Enacts IIRIRA and Limits Jurisdiction in Pending
Deportation Cases
a. Judicial Review Prior to IRIRA
In 1995, when AAADC I was decided, the INA contained three key pro-
visions governing judicial review. Section 106 of the INA governed orders
of deportation and exclusion.' 84 Subsection (a) established "the sole and
exclusive procedure for, the judicial review of all final orders of deporta-
tion . . .,,' The Courts of Appeals were granted exclusive jurisdiction.
Among other things, the section established time limits for the filing of a
petition for review, venue rules, and the requirement that, as a general rule,
"the petition shall be determined solely upon the administrative record
upon which the deportation order is based.' 86 Subsection (b) limited re-
view of a final order of exclusion to habeas corpus proceedings. 187 Sub-
section (c) provided, "[a]n order of deportation or of exclusion shall not be
reviewed by any court if the alien has not exhausted the administrative
181. AAADCII, 119F.3dat 1376.
182. See id. at 1376.
Here, the central issue is whether the government impermissibly targeted the Plain-
tiffs due to their affiliation with the PFLP, and did not so target aliens affiliated with
other foreign-dominated organizations advocating violence and destruction of prop-
erty. Thus, the stringent First Amendment standard articulated in [AAADC 1] contin-
ues to apply.
Id.
183. Id. (citing American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. v. Reno (AAADC 1), 70
F.3d 1045, 1063 (9th Cir. 1995)).
184. See 8 U.S.C. § I 105a (1994) (repealed by Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 306(b), 110 Stat.
3009-612 (1996)).
185. Id. § 1105a(a).
186. Id. § 1105a(a)(4).
187. Id. § 1105a(b).
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remedies available to him as of right under the immigration laws and regu-
lations.... ,,88
INA section 242 generally governed the apprehension and deportation of
aliens. 89 Subsection (b) set forth "the sole and exclusive procedure for
determining the deportability of an alien under this section."' 90 It deline-
ated the powers of "special inquiry officer" (later redesignated as an "im-
migration judge") and established broad due process and evidentiary
guidelines for the conduct of deportation proceedings.' 9' Although the fo-
cus of the subsection clearly was on the authority and conduct of adminis-
trative officials, in the 1957 case of Woodby v. INS, the Supreme Court de-
termined that it also imposed an obligation on reviewing courts not to
uphold any order of deportation unless it was "based upon reasonable, sub-
stantial, and probative evidence."'
' 92
In contrast to these provisions, which dealt directly with the procedure
for removing aliens from the United States, INA section 279 was much
more general. It provided that "[tihe district courts of the United States
shall have jurisdiction of all causes, civil and criminal, arising under any of
the provisions of this subchapter."'' 93 Reading it in conjunction with title
28, section 1331 of the United States Code establishing general "federal
question" jurisdiction, courts customarily found that INA section 279 con-
ferred authority to consider all matters not governed by INA sections 106
and 242(b).' 94
Certain collateral matters clearly fell within the scope of sections 106
and 242(b) of the INA and thus could not be reviewed until they reached
the court of appeals after deportation proceedings had concluded. In Foti v.
INS,' 95 the Supreme Court set forth the general rule that "all determinations
made during and incident to the administrative proceeding conducted by a
special inquiry officer [immigration judge], and reviewable together by the
[BIA] ... are... included within the ambit of the exclusive jurisdiction of
the Court of Appeals under INA sec[tion] 106(a)."' 96 Other matters clearly
fell outside their range. For example, in Cheng Fan Kwok v. INS'97 the
court found that "[a] denial by the district director of a stay of deportation
188. Id. § 1105a(c).
189. See generally 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (1994) (repealed in Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 306(b),
I 10 Stat. 3009-612 (1996)).
190. Id. § 1252(b).
191. Id.
192. Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276, 281 (1966).
193. 8 U.S.C. § 1329 (1994).
194. See generally id. §§ I105a, 1252(b).
195. 375 U.S. 217 (1963).
196. Id. at 229.
197. 392 U.S. 206 (1968).
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is not literally a 'final order of deportation,' nor is it ... entered in the
course of administrative proceedings conducted under [INA section]
242(b)."' 98 Consequently, the Supreme Court held in Cheng Fan Kwok
that this was not a matter governed by these statutory provisions and per-
mitted plaintiff to challenge the denial of the stay in district court.199
Considerable uncertainty marked other determinations, particularly if
they involved collateral challenges brought by aliens facing deportation
against whom a final order had not yet issued. In the 1980s, district courts
began entertaining challenges to general INS practices brought by aliens
facing exclusion or deportation.00 In the early 1990s, the Supreme Court
upheld the jurisdiction of a district court to hear a class action brought by
two organizational plaintiffs and by aliens whose legalization under IRCA
had been denied. That case challenged the government's actions on proce-
dural due process grounds.20  The principal suit brought by the LA 8 in
1987 and renewed in 1991 was a variant of these "pattern and practices"
suits alleging constitutional violations.
b. IIRIRA: A "Bol New Direction"
The 104th Congress pursued an aggressive agenda intended to deter "il-
legal immigration." One prong of its attack was the immigration provi-
sions of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996,202
which established a special summary deportation procedure for aliens ac-
cused of being "terrorists. ' '2°3 The other prong was its enactment, on the
last day of Congress's last session, of the IIRIRA. 20 4 Representative Lamar
Smith, the chairman of the subcommittee that drafted IIRIRA, and Edward
R. Grant, the subcommittee's general counsel, subsequently explained the
act in a symposium article:
[T]his law is by far the most comprehensive immigration reform package of the past
generation. The IIRIRA builds upon earlier reforms to control illegal immigration,
but takes such efforts in bold new directions, particularly in the areas of deterring il-
198. Id. at 212. In its decision, the Court acknowledged that the petitioner's application
"assumed the prior existence of an order of deportation." Id at 213. Nevertheless, it held
that the "petitioner did not 'attack the deportation order itself but instead [sought] relief not
inconsistent with it."' Id.
199. Id. at 216.
200. See LEGOMSKY, supra note 60, at 713-16.
201. See id.
202. Pub. L. No. 104-132, tit. IV, 110 Stat. 1258 (1996) (codified as amended at 8
U.S.C. § 1531-37 (Supp. 111996 & Supp. III 1997 & Supp. IV 1998)).
203. LEGOMSKY, supra note 60, at 713-16.
204. IIRIRA was part of the Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act of 1997, Pub. L.
No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (1996) (codified in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.)
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legal migration to the United States, and of apprehending, detaining, and removing
those who have illegally entered our country.20 5
Other commentators were less kind. One critic described it as "the most
diverse, divisive and draconian immigration law enacted since the Chinese
Exclusion Act of 1882. "206
c. IRIRA Revisions of Judicial Review
Among IIRIRA's "bold new directions" was the first comprehensive re-
vision of the judicial review provisions of the INA since its enactment in
1952.207
IIRIRA repealed INA section 106 and appended the following sentence
to INA section 279: "Nothing in this section shall be construed as provid-
ing jurisdiction for suits against the United States or its agencies or offi-
cers. ' 208 IIRIRA also continued a "bold new direction" that Congress had
embarked upon five months earlier, namely, the establishment and codifi-
cation of "alien terrorist removal procedures," which created a special "re-
205. Representative Lamar Smith & Edward R. Granit, Immigration Reform: Seeking the
Right Reasons, 28 ST. MARY'S L.J. 883, 891 (1997).
206. Dan Danilov, US. Courts Offer No Protection from Latest Immigration Law,
SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Dec. 17, 1996, at A 19, cited in David M. Grable, Note, Per-
sonhood Under the Due Process Clause: A Constitutional Analysis of the Illegal Immigra-
tion Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, 83 CORNELL L. REv. 820, 821 n.4
(1998).
207. Smith and Grant identified "limitations on appeals" as one of the most "significant
reforms" enacted by IIRIRA. See Smith & Grant, supra note 205, at 918-19. They note:
The Department of Justice has developed a sophisticated system of administrative tri-
bunals under the Executive Office of Immigration Review (EOIR) to adjudicate is-
sues relating to the removal of aliens. Decisions of the EOIR may be referred to the
Attorney General. Appeals to the federal courts, therefore, should be extraordinary
and limited to situations in which there is a likelihood of a contested issue of law or
fact relating to an alien's right to remain in the United States. Hence, section 306 of
the IIRIRA reserves appeal of an order of removal to the issue of whether the alien is
inadmissible or deportable. In contrast, issues pertaining to purely discretionary re-
lief, including cancellation of removal and voluntary departure, should remain within
the sole discretion of the Attorney General and, thus, are no longer appealable to the
federal courts. In addition, there is no right of judicial review in the case of an alien
who is removable on the grounds of a criminal conviction. On the other hand, asy-
lum, which is not purely a discretionary form of relief, remains appealable. Finally,
section 306 also places new time limits on appeals and provides, in the case of an
alien who has not been admitted to the United States, that the filing of an appeal does
not automatically stay the order of removal.
Id.
208. INA § 279, 8 U.S.C. § 1329 (Supp. It 1996) (amended by IIRIRA, Pub. L. No.
104-208, § 381(a), 110 Stat. 3009-650 (1996)).
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moval court, 20 9 special "removal court" procedures and hearings, 21° and
special rules for appealing matters arising out of the operation of the re-
moval court and the orders of deportation it would generate.
21 1
IIRIRA also modified the traditional distinction between "exclusion"
and "deportation," and adopted a new terminology to reflect the new dis-
tinction. It divided aliens subject to removal into two groups: those who
had not yet been admitted or paroled, who were classified as "applicants for
admission,, 212 and those who had been admitted or paroled, who were clas-
sified as "deportable. ' '213 Subsection 235(b) of the INA now provides for
the summary removal of most inadmissible aliens - including certain ali-
ens who have not been admitted or paroled, but excluding certain aliens
seeking refugee status - "without further hearing or review."
214
IIRIRA consolidated all other provisions relating to judicial review of
orders of removal in INA section 242.215 Subsection (a) includes a provi-
sion for "review of a final order of removal" which mirrors subsection (a)
of former INA section 106.216 Subsection (a)(2) lists a variety of matters
"not subject to judicial review," including denials of most forms of discre-
tionary relief,217 and final orders of removal issued against many aliens
non-admissible or deportable for a broad range of criminal offenses.
21 8
209. See id. § 502, 8 U.S.C. § 1532.
210. See id. §§ 503, 504, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1533, 1534.
211. See id. § 505, 8 U.S.C. § 1535.
212. See id. § 235(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a).
This group roughly corresponds to the group formerly subject to exclusion proceed-
ings under the repealed INA section 106(b), but it is broader, since it includes aliens who
enter the United States without inspection. Under prior law, any alien who successfully en-
tered the United States, whether legally or not, could not be excluded. Instead, illegal en-
trants were subject to deportation.
213. See id. § 237(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a).
214. INA § 235(b)(1)(A)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(I)A)(i) (Supp. 11 1996 & Supp. IV
1998). Aliens physically present in the United States for less than two years, and never ad-
mitted or paroled, are subject to summary removal if and when the Attorney General de-
cides to authorize the procedure in her "sole and unreviewable discretion." Id §
235(b)(1)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(l)(A) (Supp. IV 1998).
Aliens seeking asylum under INA section 208 or claiming a fear of persecution, who
otherwise would be subject to summary removal, are granted a limited opportunity to dem-
onstrate that they possess a "credible fear," and thus, are entitled to an asylum hearing, id. §
235(b)(l)(A)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i) (Supp. II 1996 & Supp. IV 1998), id §
235(b)(1)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(l)(B) and judicial review of any discretionary denial of
asylum, id. § 242(a)(2)(B)(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) (Supp. 111996).
215. See generally id. § 242(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1) (Supp. 11 1996 & Supp. IV
1998).
216. See id.




Subsection (d) precludes judicial review for any alien who has not "ex-
hausted all administrative remedies available to the alien as of right" and
also generally precludes review if another court has decided the validity of
the order.2
19
Subsection (e) limits judicial review of aliens subject to summary exclu-
sion to a truncated habeas corpus proceeding that is not permitted to reach
the merits of any due process claim.2 Subsection (e) further limits review
to actions brought in the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia to determine whether the section challenged, or any implement-
ing regulation is constitutional, not consistent with applicable provisions of
the subchapter governing deportation or otherwise is in violation of law.22'
Subsection (f) includes subsection (f)(1), which generally forbids any
court other than the Supreme Court to enjoin or restrain the operation of the
provisions of chapter 4 of title II of the INA.222 Included within this chap-
ter are INA sections 231 to 244, which deal with the "inspection, apprehen-
sion, examination, exclusion, and removal" of aliens.22 3 This limitation on
the issuance of injunctions with respect to the provisions of chapter 4, how-
ever, does not apply "with respect to the application of such provisions to
an individual alien against whom proceedings under such part have been
initiated.*2
24
Subsection (f)(2) applies only to aliens against whom final orders of re-
moval have issued. It forbids all courts from enjoining the removal "unless
DENIALS OF DISCRETIONARY RELIEF - Notwithstanding any other provision
of law, no court shall have jurisdiction to review -
(i) any judgment regarding the granting of relief under [INA sections 212(h),
212(i), 240A, 240B, or 245B], or
(ii) any other decision or action of the Attorney General the authority for which is
specified under this subchapter to be in the discretion of the Attorney General,
other than the granting of relief under [INA section 208(a)].
Id.
218. See id. § 242(a)(2)(C), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C) (Supp. 11 1996 & Supp. IV 1998).
219. See INA § 242(d)(1), (2), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1), (2).
220. See id. § 242(e)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(e)(2).
Judicial review of any determination made under section 235(b)(1) is available in ha-
beas corpus proceedings, but shall be limited to determinations of-
(A) whether the petitioner is an alien,
(B) whether the petitioner was ordered removed under such section, and
(C) whether the petitioner can prove by a preponderance of evidence [that belongs
to a statutory category, such as an alien lawfully admitted for permanent resi-
dence, not subject to summary removal.].
Id.
221. See id. § 242(e)(3)(A).
222. See id. § 242(0(1).
223. See generally id. §§ 231-244, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1221-1254.
224. Id. § 242(f)(1).
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the alien shows by clear and convincing evidence that the entry or execu-
tion of such order is prohibited as a matter of law.
' 225
Subsection 242(g) of the INA, providing for exclusive jurisdiction, reads
in its entirety:
Except as provided in this section and notwithstanding any other provision of law, no
court shall have jurisdiction to hear any cause or claim by or on behalf of any alien
arising from the decision or action by the Attorney General to commence proceed-
ings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders against any alien under this chap-
ter. 226
d Application oflIRIRA to "Transitional" Aliens
The Ninth Circuit noted that "IIRIRA explicitly provides for the retroac-
tive application of subsection (g)., 227 Similarly the Supreme Court stated
in its decision in American-Arab:
Although the general rule set forth in [section] 309(c)(1) of IIRIRA is that the revised
procedures for removing aliens, including the judicial-review procedures of [INA
section 242], do not apply to aliens who were already in either exclusion or deporta-
tion proceedings on IIRIRA's effective date, [section] 306(c)(1) of IIRIRA directs
that a single provision, [INA section 242(g)], shall apply "without limitation to claims
arising from all past, pending, or future exclusion, deportation, or removal proceed-
ings. '
229
Both courts apparently treated the on-going American-Arab litigation as
presenting "claims arising from ...pending . . . deportation or removal
proceedings.,229 The question of whether any court had jurisdiction to con-
sider the claims of the LA 8 prior, or even after, the issuance of a final or-
225. INA § 242(f)(2).
226. Id. § 242(g).
227. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. v. Reno (AAADC 11), 119 F.3d 1367,
1371 (9th Cir. 1997).
228. Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. (American-Arab), 119 S. Ct.
936, 940-41 (1999).
Section 306(c)(1) of IIRIRA generally provides that the amendments to the INA judi-
cial review provisions "shall apply to all final orders of deportation or removal and motions
to reopen filed on or after the date of the enactment of this Act." The reference to INA sub-
section 242(g) immediately follows as part of the same sentence.
229. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) (1994). Clearly, the deportation proceedings that had been
stayed against each of the LA 8 were still "pending." It is by no means clear, however, that
all of the "claims" deriving from the litigation were still "pending." AAADC I, decided in
1995, had affirmed a district court injunction in favor of the Other Six issued in 1991. The
District Court reached "the merits" of their claim five years before IIRIRA was enacted, and
the merits decision had been affirmed more than a year before IIRIRA was enacted. In 1997




der of deportation therefore turned on the judicial interpretation of the
meaning and scope of this final clause of IIRIRA section 306(c).
5. AAADC II. The Ninth Circuit Finds that the IIRIRA Did Not Deprive
the Courts of Jurisdiction
First, the LA 8 argued that INA section 242(g) did not have retroactive
application to their case.230 Additionally, the LA 8 argued that if it did ap-
ply, it did not bar the relief that the district court had granted and the Ninth
Circuit had upheld.23'
The government argued that section (g) did have a retroactive effect,
barring any judicial review or judicially mandated relief until after a final
order of deportation had been issued, and that such delay neither denied the
plaintiffs the opportunity to eventually present their case nor constituted a
denial of constitutionally protected rights.232
The Ninth Circuit concluded that subsection (g) did have retroactive ap-
plication,233 but the court found that it did not preclude the granting of in-
junctive relief under INA section 242(f).234 The court reached this conclu-
sion through several steps. First, the court emphasized the title, "Exclusive
Jurisdiction," and language in the second clause of INA section 242(g)
which, by its express terms, provided that "no court shall have jurisdiction
to hear any cause or claim by or on behalf of any alien arising from the de-
cision or action of the Attorney General to commence proceedings, adjudi-
cate cases, or execute removal orders against any alien under this chap-
ter. 2 35 The Ninth Circuit - as well as the government - read this clause
as relating to all matters arising from the moment that a deportation pro-
ceeding began until the moment that it ended.
230. See AAADC II, 119 F.3d at 1369 (discussing issues of case).
231. See id. at 1370 (noting District Court granting of injunction affirmed by Ninth Cir-
cuit).
232. See id. at 1371 (noting government's assertions). The author has not read the briefs
filed by the parties in AAADC 11. The above arguments are inferences that these were the
arguments made to the court in light of the court's opinion, as well as the briefs they filed in
the Supreme Court in American-Arab. See Brief for Petitioner, American-Arab Anti-
Discrimination Comm. v. Reno (AAADC II), 119 F.3d 1367 (9th Cir. 1997), available in
Westlaw, 1998 WL 411431; Brief for Respondent, American-Arab Anti-Discrimination
Comm. v. Reno (AAADC II), 119 F.3d 1367 (9th Cir. 1997), available in Westlaw, 1998
WL 614300; Reply Brief for the Petitioner, American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. v.
Reno (AAADC II), 119 F.3d 1367 (9th Cir 1997), available in Westlaw, 1998 WL 727540.
233. See AAADC If, 119 F.3d at 1372 (concluding subsection 242(g) did have retroac-
tive application).
234. See id. at 1374-76 (discussing and upholding injunctive relief).
235. Id. at 1371 (quoting INA section 242(g)).
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Second, the Ninth Circuit turned its attention to the introductory clause
of section 242(g): "Subsection (g) states that 'except as provided in ... [8
U.S.C. section 1252],' no court can consider any claim .... The provision
thus expressly contemplates the applicability of other jurisdictional
amendments to 8 U.S.C. [section] 1252. "236 Here, the court confronted the
difficulty caused by the first clause of IIRIRA section 306(c), which pro-
vided that "the amendments made by subsections (a) and (b) shall apply to
all final orders of deportation or removal and motions to reopen filed on or
after the date of the enactment of this Act." 237 These amendments created a
new section 242(b) of the INA in its entirety and also repealed INA section
106.
The second clause of IIRIRA section 306(c), however, establishes a
seemingly different rule for reviewing transitional claims, which appears to
limit judicial review to what is provided for in subsection (g). 238 Thus, the
court acknowledged, "[I]t is true that retroactive application of the entire
amended version of 8 U.S.C. [section] 1252 would threaten to render
meaningless section 306(c) of IIRIRA, which provides that in general, the
narrow set of jurisdictional reforms codified at 8 U.S.C. [section] 1252 do
not govern in pending cases.' 239 It went on to note, however, "[y]et a
reading of subsection (g) that did not incorporate any exceptions would
contradict the plain meaning of the text of(g).99240
Third, the court noted that subsection (g), read in isolation from the rest
of INA section 242, appears to afford no right of appeal at all, now or later,
to anyone. In the term that was later employed by the Supreme Court, it
appears to be a "zipper" clause,24 ' excluding everything not specifically in-
236. Id. at 1372 (quoting INA section 242(g)).
237. Id. at 1371 (quoting first clause of lIRIRA section 306(c)).
238. "[A]nd subsection (g) of section 242 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (as
added by subsection (a)) . . . shall apply without limitation to claims arising from all past,
pending, or future exclusion, deportation, or removal proceedings under such Act." Id.
(quoting second clause of IIRIRA section 306(c)) (emphasis in original).
239. AAADCII, 119F.3dat 1372.
240. Id.
241. As the court in American-Arab noted:
The parties' interpretive acrobatics flow from the belief that [section] 306(c)(1) can-
not be read to envision a straightforward application of the "[e]xcept as provided in
this section" portion of [section] 1252(g), since that would produce in all pending
INS cases jurisdictional restrictions identical to those that were contained in IIRIRA
anyway. That belief, however, rests on the unexamined assumption that [section]
1252(g) covers the universe of deportation claims - that it is a sort of "zipper"
clause that says "no judicial review in deportation cases unless this section provides
judicial review."
Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. (American-Arab), 119 S. Ct. 936, 943
(1999) (emphasis in original).
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cluded - and nothing is explicitly included. Thus, the Ninth Circuit con-
cluded that if the clause were read ,lite'ally, it would foreclose all possible
judicial relief, including later judicial review of a final order of deporta-
242tion .
Fourth, having identified the apparent contradiction (which both parties
also had noted and struggled with), the Ninth Circuit argued that logic re-
quired that it find some subsection of INA section 242 that could afford
them judicial review.243 How, the court asked, could Congress have in-
tended to treat transitional aliens so much worse than those who confronted
deportation after the enactment of the statute:
Divorced from all other jurisdictional provisions of IIRIRA, subsection '(g) would
have a more sweeping impact on cases filed before the statute's enactment than after
that date. Without incorporating any exceptions, the provision appears to cut off fed-
eral jurisdiction over all deportation decisions. We do not think that Congress in-
tended such an absurd result.
244
Fifth, the court identified INA section 242(f) as a likely candidate. That
provision, as we have noted, bars every court but the Supreme Court from
"enjoin[ing] or restrain[ing]" the government in a broad range of activities
related to the admission, processing, and removal of aliens.245 However,
the bar "with respect to the application of such provisions' 246 does not ap-
ply "to an individual alien against whom proceedings under [the relevant
part of the statute] have been initiated., 247 The Ninth Circuit further noted,
"[b]ecause this case involves individual aliens against whom deportation
242. See AAADC I, 119 F.3d at 1373. The court noted:
The government contends that subsection (g) alone applies and that the provision
does not cut off federal review of constitutional claims because it allows courts to
consider such claims on review of final orders of deportation. The difficulty with this
position is that the text of (g) alone does not appear to authorize judicial review of fi-
nal orders of deportation. The provision can be read as authorizing such review only
if it is read in conjunction with other subsections, such as the amended version of 8
U.S.C. [§1 1252(b)(9), which provides:
Judicial review of all questions of law and fact, including interpretation and appli-
cation of constitutional and statutory provisions, arising from any action taken or
proceeding brought to remove an alien from the United States under this chapter
shall be available only in judicial review of a final order under this section.
Id.
243. See id. at 1372 ("We believe that when it applies to pending cases, (g) must apply
along with at least some of the other provisions of section 1252, as amended by IIRIRA.")
(emphasis added).
244. Id.
245. See INA § 242(0, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(f) (1994) (giving only Supreme Court power to
enjoin government from engaging in range of activities with respect to aliens).




proceedings have been initiated, subsection (f) would appear to allow fed-
eral jurisdiction over the Plaintiffs' claims. 24 8
Finally, the court made it clear that its reason for reading the statute lib-
erally, finding a possible avenue of relief, involved constitutional consid-
erations as well as textual and logical ones:
In determining whether subsection (f) applies, and in interpreting its meaning, we are
guided by the well-established principle that where possible, jurisdiction-limiting
statutes should be interpreted to preserve the authority of the courts to consider con-
stitutional claims. The Supreme Court has stated unequivocally that "serious consti-
tutional question[s] ... would arise if a federal statute were construed to deny any ju-
dicial forum for a colorable constitutional claim." Under subsection (f), individual
aliens would appear to be able to seek judicial review of constitutional claims such as
those at issue here.
249
6. The Supreme Court Grants Petition for Writ of Certiorari Only on the
Jurisdictional Issue
On June 1, 1998, the Supreme Court granted the petition for writ of
certiorari sought by the government, but limited its grant "to the following
question: 'Whether, in light of the [IIRIRA], the courts below had jurisdic-
tion to entertain respondents' challenge to the deportation proceedings prior
to the entry of a final order of deportation?'
' 250
B. The Decision of the United States Supreme Court
1. Jurisdiction
a. The Majority Opinion and Its Rationale
Justice Scalia wrote for the majority. He found that INA section 242(g)
did apply, but not for the reasons nor in the manner that the Ninth Circuit
had found. Rather than acting as "zipper," which precludes review of all
issues arising in all deportation cases, the Court held that INA section
242(g) "applies only to three discrete actions that the Attorney General may
take: her 'decision or action' to 'commence proceedings, adjudicate cases,
or execute removal orders."' 251 The American-Arab litigation involves a
challenge to one of these discrete actions: "Respondents' challenge to the
248. Id.
249. Id. at 1372-73 (citations omitted).
250. Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 524 U.S. 903 (1998).
251. Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. (American-Arab), 119 S. Ct.
936, 943 (1999) (emphasis in original).
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Attorney General's decision to 'commence proceedings' against them falls
squarely within [section] 1252(g) - indeed ... the language seems to have
been crafted with such a challenge precisely in mind - and nothing else-
where in [section] 1252 provides for jurisdiction. 252 Thus, the Court de-
cided that subsection (g) deprives the federal courts of jurisdiction at this
point in this case, and the Court must "vacate the judgment of the Ninth
Circuit and remand with instructions for it to vacate the judgment of the
District Court."
2 53
Justice Scalia prefaces this analysis of jurisdiction with another conclu-
sion that skewers the Ninth Circuit's attempt to establish INA section
242(f) as an alternative source of jurisdiction permitted by the first clause
of subsection (g):
Even respondents scarcely try to defend the Ninth Circuit's reading of § 1252(0 as a
jurisdictional grant. By its plain terms, and even by its title, that provision is nothing
more or less than a limit on injunctive relief. It prohibits federal courts from granting
classwide injunctive relief against the operation of [sections] 1221-1231, but specifies
that this ban does not extend to individual cases. To find in this an affirmative grant
of jurisdiction is to go beyond what the language will bear.254
b. "Bricks Without Straw:" Creatively Re- Writing the Statute
Justice Scalia's approach is elegant and has more than a superficial ap-
peal. Undoubtedly, these factors persuaded four of his colleagues to join in
his opinion - and three more to concur in his judgment. Part of its appeal
lies in the assured way that Justice Scalia traverses the "horns of a di-
lemma"255 via a heretofore invisible pathway provided by Congress. That
pathway, however, is a mirage. Nonetheless, Justice Scalia makes two ar-
guments in support of his approach. Both are suspect or even false.
First, Justice Scalia argues that the authors of IIRIRA were skilled leg-
islative drafters who knew exactly what they were doing when they drafted
subsection (g). 256 Ordinarily, however, experts in a field demonstrate their
252. Id. at 945.
253. Id. at 947.
254. Id. at 942.
255. Id. at 941.
256. See id. at 943. The Court noted:
It is implausible that the mention of three discrete events along the road to deporta-
tion was a shorthand way of referring to all claims arising from deportation proceed-
ings. Not because Congress is too unpoetic to use synecdoche, but because that liter-
ary device is incompatible with the need for precision in legislative drafting. We are
aware of no other instance in the United States Code in which language such as this
has been used to impose a general jurisdictional limitation; and that those who en-
acted IIRIRA were familiar with the normal manner of imposing such a limitation is
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expertise by satisfying their intended audience. Probably no statute in re-
cent years has generated more uncertainty or confusion than IIRIRA.
Probably no part of IIRIRA has generated more confusion than its amend-
ment of the judicial review provisions of the INA. This confusion has not
been confined to those seeking benefits for alien clients; it has extended to
many governmental officials seeking to deny or limit those benefits, and to
multiple courts seeking to determine whether they have jurisdiction to
act.
257
Second, Justice Scalia supports his argument by claiming that "[t]here
was good reason for Congress to focus special attention upon, and make
special provision for, judicial review of the Attorney General's discrete acts
of 'commenc[ing] proceedings, adjudicat[ing] cases, and execut[ing] re-
moval orders' - which represent the initiation or prosecution of various
stages in the deportation process., 25 8 The "good reason" he gives is con-
gressional concern about challenges to INS exercise of discretion when it
"engage[d] in a regular practice (which had come to be known as 'deferred
action') of exercising that discretion for humanitarian reasons or simply for
its own convenience., 2 9 According to Justice Scalia, "[s]ince no generous
act goes unpunished ... the INS's exercise of this discretion opened the
door to litigation in instances where the INS chose not to exercise it.
' 260
The formal cause of such litigation was a statutory scheme that rendered
INA section 106 "inapplicable to various decisions and actions leading up
to or consequent upon final orders of deportation, and relied on other juris-
dictional statutes to permit review." 26 1 Therefore, Justice Scalia asserts,
"[s]ection 1252(g) seems clearly designed to give some measure of protec-
tion to 'no deferred action' decisions and similar discretionary determina-
tions.,, 2
62
This argument is unconvincing. Proving that a condition existed does
not prove that a subsequent measure that the government took occurred be-
cause of the original condition. Causation traditionally has been a matter of
some concern to lawyers and the court. Did Congress enact subsection (g)
to thwart "deferred action" challenges? If we refer to the legislative his-
demonstrated by the text of [section] 1252(b)(9). which stands in stark contrast to
[section] 1252(g).
Id.
257. For examples of cases demonstrating courts' contemplation of the IIRIRA's con-
fusing jurisdictional language, see 8 CHARLES GORDON ET AL., IMMIGRATION LAW AND
PROCEDURE § 104.13[4] (1999).
258. American-Arab, 119 S. Ct. at 943.
259. Id. at 943 (citing 16 GORDON ET AL., supra note 257, § 242.1 (1998)).
260. Id. at 944.
261. Id.
262. Id. (emphasis added).
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tory, we find no specific indication that the provision was "clearly de-
signed" - or indeed, designed at all - to promote that end.263 We do,
however, find legislative history demonstrating that INA section
242(a)(2)(B), not subsection (g), was intended to cut off all judicial review
of any "decision or action of the Attorney General which is specified to be
in the discretion of the Attorney General (except a discretionary judgment
whether to grant asylum) .... 264 Indeed, if we play the title game, that
subsection is entitled, "Denials of discretionary relief," whereas subsection
(g) is entitled "Exclusive jurisdiction" - and makes no reference at all to
"discretionary" actions of the Attorney General.
Second, Congress had no reason in 1996 to draft section 242(g) as a
hedge against suits brought by disappointed aliens. It is true that in 1979
the Ninth Circuit did hold that the failure to grant deferred action status un-
der particular circumstances could support a claim against the INS based on
its failure to follow its own guidelines. 265 As Aleinikoff, Martin, and Mo-
tamura noted, however, "[o]ther circuits rejected the Nicholas holding,
characterizing the [relevant INS operations instruction] as an internal
guideline for the exercise of prosecutorial discretion, they concluded that it
created no entitlement to deferred action status and that denials were not
subject to judicial review. ' 266 Further, as the same authors noted, the INS
responded to the Nicholas decision in 1981 by re-writing the relevant op-
erations instruction to state explicitly that "no alien has the right to deferred
action. It is used solely at the discretion of the Service and confers no pro-
tection or benefit upon any alien. Deferred action does not preclude the
Service from commencing removal proceedings at any time against an
alien. 267
Moreover, Justice Scalia's deferred action argument is also suspect for
another reason: having imagined circumstances that (hypothetically) justify
limiting the reach of subsection (g), he casts the statute as an (imagined)
263. Subsection (g) had not yet been added to section 242 when Congress proposed and
commented upon the Immigration and National Interest Act of 1996. See H.R. REP. No.
104-469, at 237-38 (1996). The Conference Report on IIRIRA provides no substantive in-
terpretation of subsection 242(g). See generally H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 104-828, 219-21
(1996).
264. H.R. REP. No. 104-828, at 219.
265. See Nicholas v. INS, 590 F.2d 802, 807 (9th Cir. 1979) (holding out possibility of
claim against INS for failure to follow own procedures).
266, T. ALEINIKOFF ET AL., IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP: PROCESS AND POLICY 769
(4th ed. 1998) (citing Valasco-Guiterrez v. Crossland, 732 F.2d 792 (10th Cir. 1984), and
Pasquini v. Morris, 700 F.2d 658 (11th Cir. 1983), and citing for inferential support Heckler
v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985)).
267. Id. (quoting Standard Operating Procedures for [INS] Enforcement Officers: Ar-
rest, Detention, Processing and Removal).
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congressional response to the problems the INS faces attempting to be
"generous." Of course, the INS often is generous, but it is also often bu-
reaucratic, inefficient, mean-spirited, sloppy, and harsh. If we are going to
evaluate the purpose of legislation, we ought to be honest about the "evils"
it is addressing and make a serious effort to determine who is wearing the
white hats. The sort of case that Justice Scalia's "narrow" reading puts
outside the pale of prompt review includes all of those decided in the 1980s
that questioned the government's right to treat Central American and black
Haitian asylum seekers with special severity, and which addressed the con-
stitutionality of indefinitely detaining people in federal prisons whose only
"crime" was "illegal entry." Of course, it directly includes the claims of
the LA 8, who, if they are found deportable, now will receive no judicial
review until after final deportation orders issue.
c. The Sandbag Falls: Expanding the Scope of Certiorari
The authoritative treatise on Supreme Court practice discusses the prac-
tice invoked by the Court in this case: the grant of certiorari limited to par-
ticular questions.
[Tihe Court will frequently limit its granting of a petition for certiorari to particular
questions presented in the petition. The Court uses this technique to sift out and con-
centrate attention on those issues in a case which are worthy of review, while ex-
cluding those that reveal no basis for further consideration..
2 68
The editors make three points relevant to American-Arab. First, "[a]n order
limiting the grant of certiorari to certain questions is binding upon counsel,
and argument ordinarily will not be heard on questions outside the scope of
the order., 269 Second, "[w]hile the Court's decision usually stays within
the bounds of the limited order, such an order 'does not operate as a juris-
dictional bar' to the Court's consideration of 'questions outside the scope
of the limited order when resolution of those questions is necessary for the
proper disposition of the case.' ' 270 Third, "going beyond the limited ques-




These points are relevant because the Court significantly expanded its
holding in Part III of its opinion when it asserted:
268. SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 244 (R. Stem et al. eds., 1993) (citations omitted)
[hereinafter Stem].
269. Id.




ADMINISTRATIVE LA W REVIEW
We do not believe that the doctrine of constitutional doubt has any application here.
As a general matter - and assuredly in the context of claims such as those put for-
ward in the present case - an alien unlawfully in this country has no constitutional
right to assert selective enforcement as a defense against his deportation.
272
Did the Court properly consider only those questions necessary for the
proper disposition of the case? Or did it engage in some old-fashioned ju-
dicial activism by stretching to reach constitutional issues which its juris-
dictional holding properly delayed until another day?
i. The Doctrine of "Constitutional Doubt"
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Souter proposed another reading of
IIRIRA that "reveals that Congress, apparently unintentionally, enacted
legislation that simultaneously grants and denies the right of judicial review
to certain aliens who were in deportation proceedings before April 1,
1997.273 His exegesis of IIRIRA, INA section 242, and subsection (b)
seems at least as convincing as that proposed by Justice Rehnquist - but it
commanded fewer votes.274 I do not intend to recount it exhaustively.
272. Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. (American-Arab), 119 S. Ct.
936, 945 (1999) (emphasis added).
273. Id. at 952 (Souter, J., dissenting).
274. Justice Souter begins by assuming that the effect of IIRIRA section 306(c) is in-
deed to establish INA section 242(g) as a bar to all forms ofjudicial review at any time:
[B]y operation of [IIRIRA] [section] 306(c)(1), it would appear that aliens who did
not obtain judicial review as of the enactment date of October I1, 1996, and who
were in proceedings as of IIRIRA's effective date of April 1, 1997, can never obtain
judicial review of 'the decision or action by the Attorney General to commence pro-
ceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders against any alien' in any forum.
In short, [section] 306(c)(1) appears to bar members of this class of aliens from any
review of any aspect of their claims.
Id. (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter also rejected the key part of Justice Scalia's crea-
tive reading of IIRIRA section 306(c):
The Court's interpretation, it seems to me, parses the language of subsection [242](g)
too finely for the business at hand. The chronological march from commencing pro-
ceedings, through adjudicating cases, to executing removal orders, surely gives a rea-
sonable first impression of speaking exhaustively. While it is grammatically possible
to read the series without total inclusion, [ I the implausibility of doing this appears
the moment one asks why Congress would have wanted to preserve interim review of
the particular set of decisions by the Attorney General to which the Court adverts. It
is hard to imagine that Congress meant to bar aliens already in proceedings before the
effective date from challenging the commencement of proceedings against them, but
to permit the same aliens to challenge, say, the decision of the Attorney General to
open an investigation of them or to issue a show-cause order.
Id. at 954 (Souter, J., dissenting); see also id. at 951 (Stephens, J., concurring) ("1 should
add that I agree with Justice Souter's explanation of why [section] 1252(g) applies broadly
to removal proceedings rather than to only three discrete parts of such proceedings.").
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Nonetheless, its principal conclusion is that there is no clear way of break-
ing the "tie," of avoiding the contradiction, of saying with any sort of cer-
tainty which reading of the relevant IIRIRA and INA section 242(g) provi-
sions is preferable. Under such circumstances, Justice Souter argues that
the Court should base its determination, not on the imperatives of grammar,
but on concerns about the rights of the plaintiffs.
275
According to Justice Souter, "[e]ither aliens in proceedings on April 1,
1997, have no access to judicial review or else they have the access avail-
able under the law that applied before [section] 1252 came into effect."276
Confronted with this choice, the doctrine of constitutional doubt requires a
judge to choose the option that avoids the doubtful constitutional result.
Complete preclusion of judicial review of any kind for claims brought by
aliens subject to proceedings for removal would raise the serious constitu-
tional question whether Congress may block every remedy for enforcing a
constitutional right. The principle of constitutional doubt counsels against
adopting the interpretation that raises this question. As Justice Souter
notes, "[W]here a statute is susceptible of two constructions, by one of
which grave and doubtful constitutional questions arise and by the other of




Justice Souter also notes, however, that:
This arrangement, however, conflicted with the different transitional provision set out
in [section] 309(c)(4). This section, entitled 'Transitional Changes in Judicial Re-
view,' provides that where a final order was 'entered more than 30 days after the date
of enactment of this Act,' subsection (b) [which dealt only with judicial review of ex-
clusion proceedings] of the old 8 U.S.C. [section] 1105a does not apply. This sub-
section provides for habeas corpus proceedings for 'any alien against whom a final
order of exclusion has been made.' In other words, [section] 309(c)(4) expressly
contemplates that old [section] 1105a, less its habeas provision, applies to cases
where a final order is issued more than 30 days after September 30, 1996, whereas
the original [section] 306(c)(1) as enacted contemplated that when a final order was
issued on or after September 30, 1996, the new [section] 1252 would apply.
Id. at 952-53 n. I (Souter, J., dissenting).
Justice Souter further noted, "[o]n October 4, 1996. Representative Lamar Smith of
Texas explained on the floor of the House that he had 'become aware of an apparent techni-
cal error in two provisions' of IIRIRA." Id. at 953 n.1 (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice
Souter argued that Representative Smith, who was the Chair of the House Immigration Sub-
committee, explained the error in a manner consistent with Souter's own interpretation of
the conflict beween IIRIRA section 306(c) and IIRIRA section 309(c)(4). See id. (Souter,
J., dissenting) (explaining Representative Smith's understanding of conflict).
275. Id. at 952 (Souter, J., dissenting) ("Finding no trump in the two mutually exclusive
statutory provisions, I would invoke the principle of constitutional doubt and apply the pro-
vision that avoids a potential constitutional difficulty.").
276. Id. at 953 (Souter, J., dissenting).
277. Id. at 955 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
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But Justice Scalia's analysis of the controlling statutes argues that it is
not "susceptible of two constructions." Instead, his analysis insists on one
that resolves all apparent contradictions in the statutory scheme.278 Fur-
thermore, the majority's analysis assumes that the LA 8 will eventually
have their day in court, 27 9 and that any possible additional delay has no
constitutional significance.280 Therefore, in light of the majority's ambi-
tious reasoning, Justice Scalia is correct in asserting, "[w]e do not believe
that the doctrine of constitutional doubt has any application here."28'
ii. Do Not Pass Go: Selective Enforcement Takes a Free Ride
Since, under the majority's theory of the case we are not in the realm of
constitutional doubt, the Court clearly did not have to reach the question of
selective enforcement. Alternatively, it can delay addressing that issue un-
til after the LA 8 have been given deportation hearings and found deport-
able. Under the commonly accepted standard of fairness governing Su-
preme Court practice, resolution of this question hardly "is necessary for
the proper disposition of the case. 282 So why does the Court purport to re-
solve it? Why does it, without the benefit of briefing or a hearing, "gener-
ally deprive deportable aliens of the defense of selective prosecution"?283
278. See American-Arab, 119 S. Ct. at 945. Justice Scalia states:
Our narrow reading of [section] 1252(g) makes sense of the statutory scheme as a
whole, for it resolves the supposed tension between [section] 306(c)(I) and [section]
309(c)(1). In cases to which [section] 1252(g) applies, the rest of [section] 1252 is
incorporated through the "[e]xcept as provided in this section" clause. This incorpo-
ration does not swallow [section] 309(c)(I)'s general rule that [sections] 1252(a)-(f)
do not apply to pending cases, for [section] 1252(g) applies to only a limited subset of
deportation claims. Yet it is also faithful to [section] 306(c)(1)'s command that [sec-
tion] 1252(g) be applied "without limitation" (i.e., including the "[e]xcept as pro-
vided" clause) to "claims arising from all past, pending, or future exclusion, deporta-
tion, or removal proceedings."
Id.
279. The majority identifies, but does not explicitly explain, a section 1252(a)(1) excep-
tion to section 1252(g). See id. at 945 (identifying exception). Apparently, this "exception"
is the right of every alien to appeal a final order of deportation to the courts.
280. The absence of concern about the constitutional implications of delay is apparent in
the majority's embrace of a statutory theory that permits the government to vacate a deci-
sion on behalf of the plaintiffs in the American-Arab litigation twelve years after original
charges were brought, with no consideration of any sort about why delay of such magnitude
occurred in this case, and what the cdnsequences of such delay might be on the parties in-
volved.
281. Id. at 945.
282. Stem, supra note 268, at 244.
283. American-Arab, 119 S. Ct. at 946 n.10.
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There appears to be only one possible answer: deciding the matter sum-
marily puts the focus where the majority believes it belongs - on the ab-
stract authority of the federal government to protect the national security,
unhindered by any consideration of the particular facts lying behind the
government's campaign against the LA 8 and their defense, and more gen-
erally, of the effect which such unfettered authority has on the exercise of
political association and expression.
2. The First Amendment in the Balance: Tilting the Machine
a. Justice Scalia and the Disappearance of Individual Rights
In determining that the LA 8 were entitled to bring their selective en-
forcement claims, the Ninth Circuit in AAADC I set forth "the prima facie
elements of the claim: (1) 'others similarly situated have not been prose-
cuted' (disparate impact) and (2) 'the prosecution is based on an impermis-
sible motive' (discriminatory motive). ''28 The court examined the gov-
ernment's conduct and found that both elements were present. It concluded
that:
The aliens have provided evidence of disparate impact and of impermissibly moti-
vated enforcement of the immigration laws. The aliens' First Amendment rights are
subject to irreparable harm because of the prosecution, and they have a strong likeli-
hood of success on their claim that the INS has selectively enforced the immigration
laws in retaliation for their exercise of constitutionally protected rights.
28 5
The key determinations that the court made were disparate impact,
28 6
impermissibly motivated enforcement, 287 and above all, irreparable harm
288
experienced because the government was engaged in ongoing conduct di-
rected at their associational and expressive activities that "chilled" their
First Amendment rights.28 9 Effectively, the court concluded that selective
enforcement was bad, not because it was "selective" (although it was), but
because the principle of selectivity violated fundamental values shared by
every United States resident and protected by the First Amendment.
290
284. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. v. Reno (AAADC 1). 70 F.3d 1045,
1062-63 (9th Cir. 1995) (citations omitted).
285. Id. at 1066.
286. See id. (finding aliens provided evidence of disparate impact).
287. See id. (finding aliens provided evidence of impermissibly motivated enforcement).
288. See id. at 1071 (finding irreparable harm supporting grant of injunction).
289. See id. (noting government's actions effectively amounted to "chilling" of First
Amendment rights).
290. See AAADC 1, 70 F.3d at 1066 (discussing First Amendment rights).
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Justice Scalia's approach writes the interests of the individual alien out
of the equation and deals with the selective enforcement issue as if he were
examining the right of the government to selectively issue speeding tickets
on odd-numbered days, rather than to selectively deport politically-active
residents (including four permanent resident aliens) because of their af-
filiation with, or support of, an organization engaged in constitutionally-
protected activities.291 His emphasis throughout is on the harm that will be-
fall the state if the government is impeded or regulated in any way in mak-
ing its law-enforcement decisions.
Thus, instead of emphasizing the harm that is likely to befall the activist
facing deportation, the majority emphasizes the similarity between a crimi-
nal prosecution and a deportation proceeding - the only difference (ig-
noring the absence of trial by jury, the absence of the exclusionary rule, or
the absence of any necessary evidence of a crime) being that the alien or-
dered deported will only be removed, not punished.292
Continuing with the analogy of deportation to prosecution - and paro-
dying its ordinary concern about the potential "chilling effect" of govern-
mental restrictions on free speech293 - the court next emphasizes the "chill
291. Indeed, it appears that Justice Scalia and the other members of the majority would
accord speeders more rights, because "the consideration on the other side of the ledger in
deportation cases - the interest of the target in avoiding 'selective treatment' - is less
compelling than in criminal prosecutions. While the consequences of deportation may as-
suredly be grave, they are not imposed as a punishment." American-Arab, 119 S. Ct. at 947.
292. See id at 946. The Court notes:
Even in the criminal-law field, a selective prosecution claim is a rara avis. Because
such claims invade a special province of the Executive - its prosecutorial discretion
- we have emphasized that the standard for proving them is particularly demanding,
requiring a criminal defendant to introduce "clear evidence" displacing the presump-
tion that a prosecutor has acted lawfully .... We have said:
"This broad discretion [afforded the Executive] rests largely on the recognition
that the decision to prosecute is particularly ill-suited to judicial review .... "
Id. (citation omitted). It does not merit a footnote that the history of the instant case is
largely the history of an attempt by the government to keep all of its evidence away from the
people it is attempting to deport.
293. A Westlaw search uncovered references to more than a hundred Supreme Court
decisions discussing the potential "chilling effect" on protected First Amendment rights of a
variety of federal, state, and local measures. Particularly pertinent is the dictum of the Court
in Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539, 556-57 (1963), con-
cerning a law mandating that an organization being investigated for "subversive and Com-
munist activities" produce its membership records:
While, of course, all legitimate organizations are the beneficiaries of these protec-
tions, they are all the more essential here, where the challenged privacy is that of per-
sons espousing beliefs already unpopular with their neighbors and the deterrent and
'chilling' effect on the free exercise of constitutionally enshrined rights of free
speech, expression, and association is consequently the more immediate and substan-
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to law enforcement" that will occur if enforcement decisions are examined
too closely:
Judicial supervision in this area, moreover, entails systemic costs of particular con-
cern. Examining the basis of a prosecution delays the criminal proceeding, threatens
to chill law enforcement by subjecting the prosecutor's motives and decisionmaking
to outside inquiry, and may undermine prosecutorial effectiveness by revealing the
Government's enforcement policy. All of these are substantial concerns that make
the courts properly hesitant to examine the decision whether to prosecute.
294
Of course, none of the eight plaintiffs in the American-Arab litigation
were charged with any criminal violation, and it is by no means clear that
any of their expressive or associational conduct could be criminally en-
joined under prevailing First Amendment standards. But for the Court, that
is beside the point. What matters is that these concerns about the govern-
ment's interests "are greatly magnified in the deportation context." 295 Jus-
tice Scalia gives us two principal instances, of which the first is potential
for delay:
Regarding, for example, the potential for delay: Whereas in criminal proceedings the
consequence of delay is merely to postpone the criminal's receipt of his just deserts,
in deportation proceedings the consequence is to permit and prolong a continuing
violation of United States law. Postponing justifiable deportation (in the hope that
the alien's status will change - by, for example, marriage to an American citizen -
or simply with the object of extending the alien's unlawful stay) is often the principal
object of resistance to a deportation proceeding .... 296
Undoubtedly, aliens sometimes seek to delay proceedings, hoping to
build up equities that will prolong their residence in the United States. But
the INA, both before the IIRIRA and after, is replete with measures de-
signed to thwart those who seek to better their immigration prospects while
they are in deportation proceedings. 297 More importantly, two of the Plain-
tiffs in American-Arab were already permanent resident aliens when the
tial. What we recently said in NAACP v. Button, with respect to the State of Virginia
is, as appears from the record, equally applicable here: "We cannot close our eyes to
the fact that the militant Negro civil rights movement has engendered the intense re-
sentment and opposition of the politically dominant white community ......
Florida Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. at 556-57.
294. American-Arab, 119 S. Ct. at 946 (quoting Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598,
607-08 (1985)).
295. Id. at 946.
296. Id. at 946-47.
297. See generally INA § 245(e), 8 U.S.C. § 1255(e) (1994) (denying opportunity to
"adjust status" to alien who marries a United States citizen after commencement of "admin-
istrative or judicial proceedings" to remove alien from United States); Id § 241(a), 8 U.S.C.
§ 123 1(a) (providing for detention of aliens who are found "removable," including "inad-
missible aliens" who ordinarily are not accorded opportunity to wait for long periods before
"removal" order issues).
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case began, and two others secured. that status by perfectly legal means
while the case was pending. Finally, (although the summary procedure
employed by the Court appears to be designed to obscure this fact), most of
the delay in American-Arab was due, first, to the government's filing,
withdrawing and re-filing of charges under different statutes and (slightly)
different legal theories; and second, to the interminable delays in adjudi-
cating claims, both at the trial court level (two years elapsed, for example,
between the filing of the first motion for disclosure of confidential infor-
mation, and the first decision denying it), and at the appellate level (nearly
four years elapsed before the Ninth Circuit heard the appeal in AAADC 1).
Justice Scalia's second instance is the special need to protect the sacro-
sanct realm of foreign policy and foreign intelligence:
And as for "chill[ing] law enforcement by subjecting the prosecutor's motives and
decisionmaking to outside inquiry": What will be involved in deportation cases is not
merely the disclosure of normal domestic law-enforcement priorities and techniques,
but often the disclosure of foreign-policy objectives and (as in this case) foreign-
intelligence products and techniques. The Executive should not have to disclose its
'real' reasons for deeming nationals of a particular country a special threat - or in-
deed for simply wishing to antagonize a particular foreign country by focusing on
that country's nationals - and even if it did disclose them a court would be ill
equipped to determine their authenticity and utterly unable to assess their ade-
quacy.298
In other words, it is acceptable to treat aliens as pawns in the game of
global politics. But why is this true? How can we square such a cynical
view of the world with established law holding that aliens - particularly
resident aliens - have ties to the United States that the Constitution pro-
tects?299 What principle elevates foreign-policy and foreign-intelligence
concerns over the First Amendment rights that even unpopular aliens en-
joy? Of course, there is no answer forthcoming. In the end, the Supreme
Court in American-Arab is giving us more of the same, but without an ex-
planation, only a slogan: "When an alien's continuing presence in this
country is in violation of the immigration laws, the Government does not
offend the Constitution by deporting him for the additional reason that it
believes him to be a member of an organization that supports terrorist ac-
tivity.'300 This is plenary power with a vengeance, lacking even a rhetori-
cal "fig-leaf' to cover up its naked exercise.
298. American-Arab, 119 S. Ct. at 947.
299. See, e.g., Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21 (1982); Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339
U.S. 763 (1950).
300. American-Arab, 119 S. Ct. at 947.
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b. Justice Ginsburg on Fundraising and Free Speech
Although Justice Souter's dissent took the First Amendment into ac-
count in fashioning a reading of IIRIRA and section 242(g) of the INA,
only the opinion of Justice Ginsburg (which Justice Breyer joined) 30 1 de-
voted any explicit attention to the substance of the LA 8's constitutional
claim, and the effect that more delay would have on their asserted First
Amendment rights. Justice Ginsburg "agree[s ] with Justice Scalia that
[INA section 242 (g)] applies to this case and deprives the federal courts of
jurisdiction over respondents' pre-final-order suit."30 2 Yet this conclusion
does not lead her either to support the Court's "selective enforcement" rul-
ing or to find that "the First Amendment necessitates immediate judicial
consideration of their selective enforcement plea."
30 3
Justice Ginsburg's critique of the majority's approach centers on the
First Amendment. Unlike the majority, she states unequivocally that "[i]t
is well settled that '[f]reedom of speech and of press is accorded to aliens
residing in this country. ' ,, 304 Traditionally, the Court has enjoined the gov-
ernment for selectively prosecuting individuals for constitutionally-
impermissible reasons: [T]he decision to prosecute may not be deliberately
based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbi-
trary classification, including the exercise of protected statutory and con-
stitutional rights., 30 5 A removal proceeding is not a "prosecution." Nev-
ertheless, Justice Ginsburg is "not persuaded that selective enforcement of
deportation laws should be exempt from that prescription. ''306 She prem-
ises that conclusion on the often-observed fact that deportation places "the
liberty of an individual.., at stake.... Though deportation is not techni-
cally a criminal proceeding, it visits a great hardship on the individual and
deprives him of the right to stay and live and work in this land of free-
dom .,,307
Therefore, Justice Ginsburg argues, the LA 8 must at some point be
permitted to employ the First Amendment to challenge "selective enforce-
ment."308 But she concludes that it is not necessary to permit them to do so
301. Justices Ginsburg and Breyer concurred in Part I of the Court's opinion, which
consists only of the Court's recitation of the facts and history of the case. They also con-
curred in the majority's judgment. See id. at 947-50.
302. Id. at 947.
303. Id. (emphasis added).
304. Id. at 950 (quoting Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 148 (1945)).
305. Id. at 950 (quoting Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 608 (1985)).
306. American-Arab, 119 S. Ct. at 950.
307. Id. (citation omitted).
308. Id ("[W]ere respondents to assert a colorable First Amendment claim as a now or
never matter," review would not be precluded).
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yet. First, Justice Ginsburg notes, "[t]he petition for certiorari asked this
Court to review the merits of respondents' selective enforcement objection,
but we declined to do so, granting certiorari on the jurisdictional question
only.... We thus lack full briefing on respondents' selective enforcement
plea and on the viability of such objections generally. '30 9 Second, Justice
Ginsburg argues that additional factfinding is necessary to establish the
"merits of respondents' objection.' 310
The Attorney General argued in the court below and in the petition for certiorari that
the INS may select for deportation aliens who it has reason to believe have carried
out fundraising for a foreign terrorist organization. ... Whether the INS may do so
presents a complex question in an uncharted area of the law, which we should not
rush to resolve here."'3 '
Third, Justice Ginsburg argues that additional factfinding will be possible
because "[t]he Hobbs Act authorizes a reviewing court of appeals to trans-
fer the proceedings to a district court for the resolution of material facts
when 'the agency has not held a hearing before taking the action of which
review is sought."'
312
Justice Ginsburg's opinion at least keeps the First Amendment simmer-
ing on the back burner. But it is by no means clear why she chooses to
leave it there, rather than serving it as the main course. Resolution of the
relevant constitutional issues has languished for thirteen years, so any at-
tempt to resolve them now will hardly qualify as a "rush." Admittedly,
those issues may be "complex," and the law "uncharted." But that affords
the Court no excuse for further delay. Justice Scalia correctly observes that
"Justice Ginsburg chooses to resolve the constitutional question whether
Congress can exclude the courts from remedying an alleged First Amend-
ment violation with immediate effects, pending the completion of adminis-
trative proceedings., 313 Justice Scalia is also correct when he concludes
that Justice Ginsburg's solution is potentially as far-reaching as the one he
advocates: "Our holding generally deprives deportable aliens of the defense
of selective prosecution. Hers allows all citizens and aliens to be deprived
of constitutional rights (at least where the deprivation is not 'blatantly law-
less') pending the completion of agency proceedings. 314
AAADC H provided a simple way of addressing the reach of the First
Amendment without reaching the additional complications posed by fund-
raising. But if fundraising needs to be addressed - as it surely will if and
309. Id.
310. Id. at 948.
311. Id.





when the case reaches the Ninth Circuit again - at least four of the LA 8
(Shehadeh, Hamide, Barakat, and Sharif) (the "Final Four") will be able to
present strong arguments that they face removal for constitutionally-
protected conduct and that the government should therefore be enjoined
from deporting them.
Thus, the "Final Four," if they are removable at all, are only removable
because of their association with, or activities on behalf of, the PFLP - no
status violation grounds exist for deporting them. All of the aliens in this
case already have been charged with conducting such fundraising on behalf
of the PFLP. Such fundraising, independent of any other activity and inde-
pendent of any evidence that the funds collected are being used to finance
acts of violence, is sufficient ground under current and past statutory law
for their removal.
INA section 237(a)(4)(B) provides for the removal of "[a]ny alien who
has engaged, is engaged, or at any time after admission engages in any ter-
rorist activity as defined in [INA section 212](a)(3)(B)(iii)." INA section
212(a)(3)(B)(iii) defines "engage in terrorist activity" to include two sorts
of support. The first encompasses "the providing of any type of material
support, including a safe house, transportation, communications, funds,
false documentation or identification, weapons, explosives, or training, to
any individual the actor knows or has reason to believe has committed or
plans to commit a terrorist activity." 315 The second encompasses "the so-
liciting of any funds or other things of value for terrorist activity or for any
terrorist organization. 31 6 INA section 219(a)(1) permits the Secretary of
State to designate a "foreign organization" which "engages in terrorist ac-
tivity" as a "terrorist organization," provided that "the terrorist activity of
the organization threatens the security of United States nationals or the na-
tional security of the United States." 317 The PFLP is currently designated
as a "terrorist organization, 318 - as it has been officially since 1990, and
unofficially since 1987 or 1988. 319
315. INA § 242(a)(3)(B)(iii), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iii) (1994 & Supp. 111996).
316. Id. § 212(a)(3)(B)(iii)(lll) & (IV).
317. Id. § 219(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a)(1).
318. See id.
319. The term "terrorist organization" was first enacted into law in the IMMACT of
1990, which repealed INA sections 212(a)(27), (28), (29), and 237(a)(6), and enacted INA
sections 212(a)(3) and 237(a)(4), establishing new statutory grounds for excluding and de-
porting "terrorists" and other threats to "national security." According to the House Confer-
ence Report:
[T]he conferees consider a "terrorist organization" to be one whose leadership, or
whose members, with the knowledge, approval or acquiescence of the leadership,
have taken part in terrorist activities. In making determinations for the purpose of
establishing excludability, the Department of State (or the Immigration Service when
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The effect of these provisions is to render deportable anyone who solic-
its funds or renders any financial support to any "terrorist organization,"
without regard to the purpose, place, or manner of the solicitation or con-
tribution, and without regard to the specific use to which the organization is
likely to put that contribution. Indeed, in its Preamble to its "Prohibition of
International Terrorist Fundraising," Congress in 1996 insisted that:
(6) some foreign terrorist organizations, acting through affiliated groups or individu-
als, raise significant funds within the United States, or use the United States as a con-
duit for the receipt of funds raised in other nations; and
(7) foreign organizations that engage in terrorist activity are so tainted by their
criminal conduct that any contribution to such an organization facilitates that con-
duct.320
The unconstitutionality of these provisions is problematic only because
American-Arab is an immigration case. For at least a half-century, the Su-
preme Court has recognized that the First Amendment protects fundraising.
It has imposed strict limits on governmental restrictions on governmental
restrictions on campaign financing, 321 and also on charitable solicitation.322
In Buckley v. Valeo, the Court addressed limits imposed by the Federal
Election Campaign Act of 1971 on political contributions made by an indi-
appropriate) should take into account the best available information from the intelli-
gence community. A group may be considered a terrorist organization even if it has
not conducted terrorist operations in the past several years, but there is reason to be-
lieve it still has the capacity and inclination to conduct such operations.
H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 101-955, at 131, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6796. In 1996, Con-
gress added INA section 219 to formalize the process of "designating" terrorist organiza-
tions. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-518, 2d Sess., reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 944
(INA section 219 is created by section 302 of the AEDPA, tit. III, Pub. L. No. 104-132,
1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. (110 Stat.) 1248).
As the American-Arab case illustrates, this authority to designate "terrorist organiza-
tions" was employed immediately by the INS against the PFLP in 1990. However, the leg-
islative history of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act for 1988 and 1989 indicates that
Congress had begun informally to couple the term "terrorist" with particular organizations
as early as 1987, and had effectively identified the PLO and its constitutive sub-groups as
"terrorist organizations" underserving of immigration benefits. See supra notes 66-72 and
accompanying text.
320. AEDPA § 301(a) (emphasis added).
321. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1(1975).
322. See generally Jon Strauss, First Amendment Protection of Charitable Solicitation,
13 WHrnrIR L. REv. 669 (1992) (discussing principal cases, including Village of
Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620 (1980), Secretary of State v. Jo-
seph H. Munon Co., 467 U.S. 947 (1984), and Riley v. National Fed'n of the Blind of N. C.,
Inc., 487 U.S. 781 (1988)). Jon Strauss's article also discusses earlier cases finding that the
First Amendment offered protection to the private solicitation of funds, including Schneider
v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945); and Hynes v. Mayor
of Oradell, 425 U.S. 610 (1976).
[52:1
AMERICAN-ARAB
vidual, or to a particular candidate. It looked to the particular setting in
which the regulated contributions were made, a campaign for political of-
fice. Yet it reaffirmed much broader First Amendment values.
First, it reasserted "our 'profound national commitment to the principle
that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide
open, ' 1323 and the necessity of "afford[ing] the broadest protection to such
political expression in order 'to assure [the] unfettered interchange of ideas
for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the peo-
ple."
3 24
Second, it recognized that there is force in numbers, that effective politi-
cal advocacy requires organization:
The First Amendment protects political association as well as political expression.
The constitutional right of association explicated in NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S.
449, 460 (1958), stemmed from the Court's recognition that "[ejffective advocacy of
both public and private points of view, particularly controversial ones, is undeniably
enhanced by group association." Subsequent decisions have made clear that the First
and Fourteenth Amendments guarantee "'freedom to associate with others for the
common advancement of political beliefs and ideas."'
325
Third, and most importantly, it found that "association," in and of itself,
is not enough, that effective political speech requires the expenditure of
money:
A restriction of the amount of money a person or group can spend on political com-
munication ... necessarily reduces the quantity of expression by restricting the num-
ber of issues discussed, the depth of their exploration, and the size of the audience
reached.... 'he distribution of the humblest handbill or leaflet entails printing, pa-
per, and circulation costs. Speeches and rallies generally necessitate hiring a hall and
publicizing the event. The electorate's increasing dependence on television, radio,
and other mass media for news and information has made these expensive modes of
communication indispensable instruments of effective political speech.326
The record in American-Arab is replete with evidence that the LA 8
were engaged in political speech, that the government objected to the con-
tent of that speech, and that it initiated deportation proceedings against
them to curtail that speech.327
323. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 14 (quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,
270 (1964)).
324. Id at 14 (quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957)).
325. Id. at 15 (per curium).
326. Id. at 19.
327. According to the brief filed by the Respondents in American-Arab:
Contemporaneous FBI memoranda prepared to urge the INS to deport plaintiffs con-
firm that plaintiffs were targeted solely for lawful political associations and advocacy.
The documents consist entirely of accounts of lawful political activity, and include
detailed reports on political demonstrations, meetings, and dinners, as well as exten-
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Clearly, the logic of Buckley would protect fundraising intended to fa-
cilitate such political expression, if engaged in by United States citizens.
For First Amendment purposes, it simply would be irrelevant if such fund-
raising were intended to marshal support for President Reagan, Israel, and
the Middle East "Peace Process" - or opposition to all three.
Of course, contributions and the solicitation of funds also might be di-
rected to non-political recipients - to schools or clinics, for example. The
recipients might be located in the United States, or abroad. According to
the American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee, a "major priority for
the Justice Department has been criminalizing, and stopping, humanitarian
aid to schools, medical facilities and even orphanages located overseas that




But such contributions do not lose their First Amendment protection
merely because donors intend to promote social or humanitarian goals,
rather than overtly political ones. On three occasions between 1980-88 the
Supreme Court examined state regulations seeking to restrict "charitable
solicitation." In each, the Court found that such solicitation was entitled to
broad protection under the First Amendment. In Village of Schaumburg v.
Citizens for a Better Environment,329 the Court rejected a governmental
body's argument that a restrictive ordinance should be sustained "because
it deals only with solicitation and because any charity is free to propagate
its views . .. without a permit as long as it refrains from soliciting
money."330 The Court examined nine earlier cases decided by the Supreme
Court between 1942-76 and concluded that "[p]rior authorities ... clearly
establish that charitable appeals for funds ... involve a variety of speech
interests - communication of information, the dissemination and propaga-
tion of views and ideas, and the advocacy of causes - that are within the
protection of the First Amendment."
331
sive quotations from political speeches and leaflets. Over 300 pages are devoted to
tracking plaintiffs' distribution of PFLP newspapers that are available in public li-
braries throughout the United States. The memos repeatedly criticize plaintiffs' po-
litical views as "anti-US, anti-Israel. anti-Jordan," and even "anti-REAGAN and anti-
MABARAK [sic]." . . . The principal FBI report ...specifically urges plaintiff
Hamide's deportation, not because he engaged in any criminal acts, but because he is
"intelligent, aggressive, dedicated, and shows great leadership ability."
Brief for the Respondents, No. 97-1252 (Supreme Court, October Term, 1997), available in
Westlaw, 1998 WL 614300.
328. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee Press Release, The Selective and
Political Targeting of Arab Immigrants.
329. 444 U.S. 620 (1980).




Although it permitted "reasonable regulation" of those [s]oliciting finan-
cial support," the Court in Village of Schaumburg indicated that such
regulation:
must be undertaken with due regard for the reality that solicitation is characteristi-
cally intertwined with informative and perhaps persuasive speech seeking support for
particular causes or particular views on economic, political, or social issues, and for
the reality that without solicitation the flow of such information and advocacy would
likely cease.332
Without regard for the specific "message" intended to be conveyed by the
plaintiff or the fact that the ordinance in question reached all organizations
equally, 333 it therefore subjected the ordinance in question to searching
scrutiny under the First Amendment, and asserted: "[t]he [government]
may serve its legitimate interests, but it must do so by narrowly drawn
regulations designed to serve those interests without necessarily interfering
with First Amendment freedoms. 334 The regulating authority was not able
to meet this burden.
335
The Court struck down similar limitations on the solicitation of funds in
Secretary of State of Maryland v. Munson336 and Riley v. National Federa-
tion of the Blind of North Carolina, Inc.33 7 In both cases, it continued to
subject "the State[s'] statutes to exacting First Amendment scrutiny. 3 8
This scrutiny led to the invalidation of all of the restrictions being chal-
lenged.
Finally, a third line of cases must be noted. In 1961, the Supreme Court
upheld the conviction under the Smith Act of Junius Irving Scales because
he was an "'active' member of the [Communist] party., 339 The same day,
the Court overturned the conviction under the Smith Act of John Francis
Noto, against whom no credible evidence of active party membership had
been presented.340 Although it reached different results in these cases, the
332. Id.
333. The ordinance at issue was "content neutral" in the sense that it denied solicitation
permits to every organization that did not direct at least 75% of all monies collected to the
ultimate charitable beneficiaries. See id. at 835 n.9.
334. Id. at 836.
335. Village of Schaumburg, 444 U.S. at 835 ("We agree with the Court of Appeals that
the 75-percent limitation is a direct and substantial limitation on protected activity that can-
not be sustained unless it serves a sufficiently strong, subordinating interest that the Village
is entitled to protect. We also agree that the Village's proffered justifications are inadequate
and that the ordinance cannot survive scrutiny under the First Amendment.").
336. 467 U.S. 947 (1984).
337. 487 U.S. 781 (1988).
338. Id. at 789.
339. Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 224 (1961).
340. Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290, 298-99 (1961).
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Court presented two common themes. First, it suggested that evidence of
knowing, willing, and active support of an organization's proscribed ac-
tivities was necessary to avoid constitutional difficulties: "[w]e decline to
attribute to Congress a purpose to punish nominal membership, even
though accompanied by 'knowledge' and 'intent' . . . because of the close
constitutional questions that such a purpose would raise."341 Second, it in-
sisted that the "activity" that constitutionally could be punished must be
examined carefully and construed strictly, "for otherwise there is a danger
that one in sympathy with the legitimate aims of... an organization, but
not specifically intending to accomplish them by resort to violence, might
be punished for his adherence to lawful and constitutionally-protected pur-
poses, because of other and unprotected purposes which he does not neces-
sarily share. 342 In a subsequent case, the Court required the government to
"establish [the individual's] knowing affiliation with an organization pos-
sessing unlawful aims and goals, and a specific intent to further those ille-
gal aims.
343
Despite this history, the only case directly to confront AEDPA's fund-
raising restrictions has rejected arguments that the statute's restrictions on
solicitation be subjected to such "exacting" scrutiny. Thus Humanitarian
Law Project v. Reno,3 4 in an opinion written by Judge Collins, found that
those seeking to make such contributions can invoke the First Amendment
to challenge governmental regulations prohibiting or penalizing them.
345
However, it held that the "fact that AEDPA burdens protected First
Amendment rights is only the first step of the Court's analysis." 346 The
second step is determining the "standard of review that the Court should
apply;" the third is applying that standard.347
Judge Collins identified two potentially relevant standards of review.
The first holds that "[a] regulation that prohibits expression or association
based on disapproval of the content of the speech is subject to the most ex-
acting scrutiny. ' 348 The second holds that "when the government's regula-
tion is unrelated to the suppression of a particular message or idea, it is
content-neutral, and subject to an intermediate standard of review." 349 It
341. Scales, 367 U.S. at 222.
342. Noto, 367 U.S. at 299-300.
343. Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 186 (1972).
344. 9 F. Supp.2d 1176 (C.D. Cal. 1998).
345. Id. at 1185-86.
346. Id. at 1186.
347. Id.
348. Id. (quoting R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992), for the proposi-
tion that First Amendment prohibits government from "proscribing speech or even expres-
sive conduct because of the ideas expressed").
349. Id. (citing Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 643 (1994) and United States
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then found that "[n]otwithstanding its obstruction of material support to
specified organizations, the Court finds that the AEDPA is in fact a con-
tent-neutral regulation of the Plaintiffs' political speech and association.' 350
Having made that finding, it applied the "intermediate standard of review"
enunciated in United States v. O'Brien,35 1 and "balanced" the governmental
interests supporting the regulation against the statute's impact on those
seeking to contribute their support to the proscribed organizations.352
As a result, he refused to extend constitutional protection to individuals
who did not "seek to support any military or unlawful activities" of par-
ticular "terrorist organizations," but instead sought only "to solicit and
make donations of cash, clothing, food, including prepared food for infants,
and educational materials" to those organizations" for humanitarian assis-
tance" or to support their "humanitarian, social, and political efforts."
353
However four things are surprising. First, Judge Collins makes no refer-
ence at all to the Village of Schaumburg, Munson, and Riley cases, and to
their common holding that governmental fundraising restrictions are sub-
ject to heightened or "exacting" First Amendment review. Second, in
turning to the O'Brien "intermediate standard of review," he ignores the
fact that the Supreme Court in Buckley repudiated that standard in political
fundraising cases.354 Thus Judge Collins quotes the following passage
from Buckley: "this Court has never suggested that the dependence of a
communication on the expenditure of money operates itself to introduce a
non-speech element or to reduce the exacting scrutiny required by the First
v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968)).
350. Humanitarian Law Project, 9 F. Supp.2d at 1188.
351. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
352. As articulated in O'Brien, in analyzing whether a content-neutral regulation that
affects First Amendment activity is justified, a court must determine the following:
(1) whether the regulation is within the power of the government;
(2) whether the regulation furthers an important or substantial governmental interest;
(3) whether the proffered interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression;
and
(4) whether the incidental restriction on First Amendment freedoms is no greater than
is essential to further the important interest.
Id. at 1192 (citing O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377). Applying the O'Brien test, the court con-
cluded:
Plaintiffs have failed to establish a probability of success on the merits on their claim
that the AEDPA's prohibitions on all material support to designated terrorist organi-
zations, regardless of the individual's lack of intent to further illegal activities, vio-
lates their First Amendment rights to freedom of speech and association.
Id. at 1196-97.
353. Id. at 1183-84. The intended recipient organizations were the Liberation Tigers of
Tamil Eelam (a.k.a. Tamil Tigers or LTTE) and the Kurdistan Workers' Party (a.k.a. PKK).
354. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1(1976)
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Amendment." 355 But he conspicuously omits the passage in Buckley that
immediately precedes the one quoted: "We cannot share the view that the
present Act's contribution and expenditure limitations are comparable to
the restrictions on conduct upheld in O'Brien. The expenditure of money
simply cannot be equated with such conduct as destruction of a draft
card. 356
Third, Judge Collins' conclusion that the restrictions imposed by
AEDPA are not content-based is inherently implausible. Political, eco-
nomic, and social-financial contributions and fundraising are activities
protected by the First Amendment. The Government has specially desig-
nated some thirty potential recipients as "terrorist organizations," and
barred all "material support" to those organizations on pain of imprison-
ment or deportation. As the record in American-Arab shows, it may have
designated some of those organizations for reasons that may have some-
thing to do with actual or threatened "terrorist" attacks, but it clearly has
designated other organizations, including the PFLP, for reasons relating to
the objectives of United States foreign policy, and the goal of silencing op-
position to that policy. Finally, although his decision quotes from Healy v.
James, it does not recognize or acknowledge the necessity, announced
clearly in Noto, of distinguishing carefully between activity that is consti-
tutionally protected and that which is not.
Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno is thus a very vulnerable opinion.
But it demonstrates that fundraising remains problematic as a First
Amendment issue. Judge Collins' willingness to extend so much deference
to the government on this issue suggests that if and when it arises again in
American-Arab, it will be fiercely contested.357
3. Down by Law
Toward the beginning of his career as Chief Justice, William Rehnquist
wrote an opinion that avoided a constitutional question crying out for
resolution. The case was Jean v. Nelson.358 The question presented to the
Court was the right of the government to accord differential treatment to
aliens on the basis of their race. The question arose because the INS in Mi-
ami had embarked on a policy of holding "illegal" Haitians in detention -
355. Id. at 16.
356. Id.
357. "Although not on the issue of what constitutes "material support" with respect to
statutory prohibitions on "personnel" and "training." Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno
found that these terms, as they are employed in title 18, section 2339A(b) of the United
States Code are so unclear that they are likely, in a merits determination, to be found "void
for vagueness." 9 F. Supp.2d 1176, 1202-04 (C.D. Cal. 1998).
358. 472 U.S. 846 (1985).
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all of whom were black - at the same time that it was paroling Cubans and
other "illegals" back into society. A generation earlier, Justice Frankfurter,
concurring in Harisiades v. Shaughnessy,359 had restated the "plenary
power" doctrine enunciated by the Supreme Court in Chae Chan Ping v.
United States,360 Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 361 and Nishimura Ekiu v.
United States.362 According to Justice Frankfurter:
It is not for this Court to reshape a world order based on politically sovereign States.
In such an international ordering of the world a national State implies a special rela-
tionship of one body of people, i.e., citizens of that State, whereby the citizens of
each State are aliens in relation to every other State. Ever since national States have
come into being, the right of people to enjoy the hospitality of a State of which they
are not citizens has been a matter of political determination by each State... Though
as a matter of political outlook and economic need this country has traditionally wel-
comed aliens to come to its shores, it has done so exclusively as a matter of political
outlook and national self-interest. This policy has been a political policy, belonging
to the political branch of the Government wholly outside the concern and the compe-
tence of the Judiciary.
363
The natural consequence of this view was absolute abstention, even in the
face of the most overt acts of governmental prejudice:
The conditions for entry of every alien, the particular classes of aliens that shall be
denied entry altogether, the basis for determining such classification, the right to ter-
minate hospitality to aliens, the grounds on which such determination shall be based,
have been recognized as matters solely for the responsibility of the Congress and
wholly outside the power of this Court to control .... [W]hether immigration laws
have been crude and cruel, whether they may have reflected xenophobia in general or
anti-Semitism or anti-Catholicism, the responsibility belongs to Congress. Courts do
enforce the requirements imposed by Congress upon officials in administering immi-
gration laws, and the requirement of Due Process may entail certain procedural ob-
servances. But the underlying policies of what classes of aliens shall be allowed to
enter and what classes of aliens shall be allowed to stay, are for Congress exclusively
to determine even though such determination may be deemed to offend American
traditions and may, as has been the case, jeopardize peace.36
Yet reluctantly and grudgingly, the majority in Harisiades continued a
trend that had its earliest roots in a case decided in 1903, namely, the ex-
tension of more extensive constitutional rights to aliens already physically
present in the United States.365 In addition, two years after it decided Hari-
359. 342 U.S. 580 (1952).
360. 130 U.S. 581 (1889).
361. 149 U.S. 698 (1893).
362. 142 U.S. 651 (1892).
363. Harisiades, 342 U.S. at 596.
364. Id. at 596-97 (citations omitted).
365. See Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 86 (1903) (extending constitutional rights to ali-
ens already present in the United States).
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siades, in Brown v. Board of Education,36 the Court assumed a new role in
the struggle to eradicate racism from American society. So the real ques-
tion presented in Jean v. Nelson367 was whether the Court would take the
opportunity to bring immigration law into line with the rest of American
law when confronting an important national issue.368
Justice Rehnquist, in effect, declined. The Eleventh Circuit had found a
broad power to discriminate, based on the Court's historical insistence that
the Congress and Executive possessed virtually unlimited and unreview-
able power where excludable aliens were concerned.369  The Supreme
Court set aside the Circuit Court decision, not because it decided the equal
protection challenge wrongly, but because it chose to address it at all:
We conclude that the Court of Appeals should not have reached and decided the pa-
role question on constitutional grounds, but we affirm its judgment remanding the
case to the District Court... Had the court in Jean II followed [the] rule [of avoiding
unnecessary constitutional construction], it would have addressed the issue involving
the immigration statutes and INS regulations first, instead of after its discussion of the
Constitution. Because the current statutes and regulations provide petitioners with
nondiscriminatory parole consideration - which is all they seek to obtain by virtue
of their constitutional argument -there was no need to address the constitutional is-
sue.
370
As Justices Marshall and Brennan persuasively demonstrated, however, the
regulations at issue did not in fact prohibit racial discrimination, and so
served as no substitute for the Court's constitutional judgment.37" '
366. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
367. 472 U.S. 846 (1985).
368. See id.
369. See Jean v. Nelson, 727 F. 2d 957, 968 (11th Cir. 1984) (en banc).
While resident aliens, regardless of their legal status, are therefore entitled to at least
limited due process rights, aliens "who have never been naturalized, nor acquired any
domicile or residence within the United States, nor even been admitted into the coun-
try pursuant to law" stand in every different posture: "As to such persons, the deci-
sions of executive or administrative officers, acting within powers expressly con-
ferred by congress, are due process of law."
In the eighty years since the Court first recognized this distinction between the
rights of excludable and deportable aliens, it has become engrained in our law.
Id. (citation omitted).
370. Jean v. Nelson, 472 U.S. 846, 848, 854-55 (1985).
371. See id. at 858-59 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
The Court's decision rests entirely on the premise that the parole regulations promul-
gated during the course of this litigation preclude INS officials from considering race
and national origin in making parole decisions. The Court then reasons that if peti-
tioners can show disparate treatment based on race or national origin, these regula-
tions would provide them with all the relief that they seek. Thus, it sees no need to
address the independent question whether such disparate treatment would also violate
the Constitution, and invokes Ashwander v. TVA to avoid deciding that question. If
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Since it avoided the question in Jean, the Supreme Court has seldom
taken a stand that the Constitution, treaties, or acts of Congress afford any
protection to the alien engaged in a conflict with the government. The
most prominent exception probably has been Landon v. Plasencia,372 which
determined that a returning resident alien was entitled to some measure of
procedural due process. 373 In that case the Court devoted significant, al-
though not voluminous, attention to the "facts" of Mrs. Plasencia's resi-
dence, departure, and return.
The other important exception was INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca,374 decided
in 1987, which determined that under prevailing United States and interna-
tional standards, an alien seeking to qualify as a refugee need not demon-
strate a clear probability of persecution, but only a "well-founded fear"
which if genuine, could be supported by a chance of harm no greater than
one in ten.375
The general pattern, however, since Jean - and particularly since Car-
doza-Fonseca - has been otherwise. The Court, in dealing with immigra-
tion cases, has chosen to speculate about the harm that aliens might do and
all of the reasons that the stories they tell are likely to be misleading or
false. More importantly, the Court has chosen to minimize the significance
of protective interpretive contexts, guidelines imposed by tradition, and
tests that were designed to afford the individual a basis for making claims
against the state. The First Amendment, implicated in Harisiades and
American-Arab, establishes one such context, as does the due process
clause of the First Amendment, implicated in Landon v. Plasencia. But,
extra-constitutional sources of protection exist as well. For example, some
of the terms of the INA, particularly those that confer the benefit of "asy-
lum," provide extra-constitutional protections.376 Also, the 1951 Conven-
the initial premise were correct, the Court's decision would be sound. But because it
is not, the remainder of the Court's opinion simply collapses like a house of cards...
[A]n examination of the regulations themselves, as well as the statutes and adminis-
trative practices governing the parole of unadmitted aliens, indicates that there are no
nonconstitutional constraints on the Executive's authority to make national-origin
distinctions.
Id.
372. 459 U.S. 21 (1982).
373. Id. at 32 (agreeing that resident alien can invoke due process upon returning to
country).
374. 480 U.S. 421 (1987).
375. See id. at 431 (citing I A. GRAHL-MADSEN, THE STATUS OF REFUGEES IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 180 (1966)).
376. See INA § 101(a)(42), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(42) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998) (defining
"refugee"); Id. § 208, 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (establishing the eligibility criteria for seeking and
obtaining "asylum").
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tion relating to the Status of Refugees 377 as well as the 1967 Protocol re-
lating to the Status of Refugees provide protections outside the realm of the
constitution.7
The interpretation that the Court has accorded these documents in recent
years has often, in the words of the dissenters in Elias-Zacarias v. INS,379
been "narrow and grudging. '380 In Elias-Zacarias, that narrow approach
led the Court to conclude that a young man who claimed he faced forced
conscription by a guerrilla army either was lying or, if confronting a genu-
ine hardship, faced something that did not fit the statutory definition of
"persecution," and so did not entitle him to asylum. 381
In Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc.,382 the Court rejected a challenge
to the United States policy of "interdicting" Haitian "boat people" on the
high seas, and returning them to Haiti without granting them the opportu-
nity to make a claim under section 243(h)(1) of the INA, which then read:
The Attorney General shall not deport or return any alien (other than an alien de-
scribed in section 1251 (a)(4)(D) of this title) to a country if the Attorney General de-
termines that such alien's life or freedom would be threatened in such country on ac-
count of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or
political opinion. 3
The court accomplished this result by ignoring the plain meaning of INA
section 243(h) and Article 33 of the 1951 Refugee Convention. 38 4
As the wheel has turned, an occasional alien plaintiff has emerged on
top. Generally, however, facts have been subordinated to law, and the
more humane aspects of the law to its harsher, more sadist side.
CONCLUSION
Thus, the approach taken by the Court in American-Arab is not an ex-
ception to the rule, it is merely an exemplification. The LA 8 remain in the
United States pending deportation hearings. A move is afoot to secure spe-
cial legislative protection for them. If that initiative fails, all will face final
377. 189 U.N.T.S. 137 (July 28, 1951).
378. 19 U.S.T. 6223, T.I.A.S. No. 6577, 606 U.N.T.S. 267 (Jan. 31, 1967).
379. 502 U.S. 478 (1992).
380. Id. at 487.
381. Id. at 480.
382. 509 U.S. 155 (1993).
383. Id. at 170. The statutory language at issue in Sale has since been redesignated as
INA section 241(b)(3)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A), and has been modified somewhat.
384. See generally Keith Highet & George Kahale III, Aliens - Interdiction of Haitians
on High Seas - Definition of 'Return' Under US. Statute - Extraterritorial Effect of Stat-
ute (Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2549), 88 Am. J. INT'L L. 114 (1994)
(noting court rejected bilateral agreement between United States and Haiti).
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orders of deportation. They will finally get the opportunity to have their
case heard on the merits. For the Other Four - Bashar Amer, Julie Mun-
gai, Amjad Obeid, and Ayman Obeid - that is likely to bring little com-
fort, since their best legal claim was "selective enforcement," now rejected
by the Supreme Court. For Khader Hamide and Michel Shehadeh, and also
for Aiad Barakat and Naim Sharif, the prospects are better since they
should eventually be able to secure a hearing on their First Amendment
claims. The government's belated decision to open its files also should
permit them to defend the proposition that they face deportation, not be-
cause of their support of violence or engagement in lawless conduct, but
because they have dared to associate with parties opposed to United States
policy in the Middle East. But American-Arab raises questions that go well
beyond the ultimate fate of the LA 8: will this Supreme Court find a way to
take the situation of individual aliens into account, according respectful at-
tention to the law that protects them? Or will it choose to continue to keep
its thumbs firmly on the government's side of the balance?

